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GETTING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
WHERE THEY NEED TO GO WITHOUT 
TAKING TAXPAYERS FOR A RIDE: 
“CABS,” WHY THEY ARE USED, AND WHAT 
CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT THEIR MISUSE 
HEATHER G. WHITE* 
The United States has tremendous infrastructure needs, and if those needs are to be 
met, local governments are likely to play a significant role in fulfilling them.  Local 
governments spend hundreds of billions of dollars annually building infrastructure, and 
much of this is financed with debt in the form of bonds payable from real property taxes.  
Ideally, the cost of a capital project would be spread evenly over its life so all taxpayers 
who benefit from the project contribute to its cost.  However, local political leaders have 
incentives to defer payment, requiring future taxpayers to pay more than their fair share.  
This article discusses an extreme example of this—the use of long-term compound 
interest bonds, on which neither principal nor interest is paid until at or near maturity.  
The article describes the problems with the extensive use of this form of financing and 
explores the reasons California and Texas school districts issue hundreds of millions of 
dollars of these bonds annually, then considers alternative means of addressing those 
problems, including recent California and Texas legislation.  It is critical that problems 
with the framework within which local governments issue debt, such as those that lead to 
the misuse of long-term compound interest bonds, be addressed. 
 
*  Ms. White is a practicing public finance lawyer affiliated with Nixon Peabody LLP and is a 
fellow in the Taxation Law and Policy Research Group at the University of Western Australia Law 
School.  Thanks to Rick Krever, to my professional colleagues, and to participants at the Australasian 
Tax Teachers Association conference and the Monash University Taxation Law and Policy Research 
Group symposium for helpful comments.  All errors are my own. 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
Every four years, the American Society of Civil Engineers releases its 
Infrastructure Report Card, which, like a school report card, assigns a 
letter grade to the condition of American infrastructure.1  The 2017 grade 
is a D+, and the Society indicates that nearly $4.6 trillion of infrastructure 
investment is needed over the next ten years.2  If pressing infrastructure 
needs are to be met, it is likely that local governments will play a major role 
in fulfilling them.  Local governments construct much of the public 
infrastructure in the United States, and President Trump’s infrastructure 
plan is expected to require substantial spending by local governments.3   
Local governments frequently borrow to build facilities, many of which 
are intended to last for decades.4  Ideally, the cost of this infrastructure—
and hence the payments on the debt issued to finance it—would be spread 
evenly over its life so that neither today’s nor tomorrow’s taxpayers (or 
users) pay more than their fair share.  Yet, in recent years, in California, 
Texas, and elsewhere, there has been considerable—perhaps even 
excessive—reliance on long-term compound interest bonds (referred to as 
“capital appreciation bonds” or “CABs”), on which neither principal nor 
interest is paid until at or near maturity.5  This article explores this 
phenomenon, considers some of the factors that may cause local 
governments to resort to a financing structure that on its face seems 
unfair, and presents alternative means of addressing misuse of this 
financing tool, including recent California and Texas legislation.   
This article focuses on the use, by California and Texas school districts, 
of debt that is payable from property taxes (referred to as “general 
obligation bonds”)6 and the reasons districts sometimes issue this debt in 
 
1. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD 1 (2017). 
2. Id. at 5, 8. 
3. See Jim Watts, Trump’s $1 Trillion Infrastructure Plan Requires State, Local Funding Match, The 
BOND BUYER (June 7, 2017), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/trumps-1-trillion-infrastructure-
plan-requires-state-local-funding-match [https://perma.cc/KN2N-AND9] (noting the plan would 
require states and localities to provide matching funds to obtain federal funding for infrastructure). 
4. See GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30638, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: A 
DESCRIPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 1 (2016) (“[W]hen a municipal 
government issues bonds, the principal (or proceeds) is typically used to finance the construction of 
capital facilities”).  
5. See infra note 9 and Part III for a discussion of the problems associated with CABs. 
6. The term “general obligation bonds” refers to bonds supported by the issuer’s full faith and 
credit, power to levy ad valorem property taxes, or both.  NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, GENERAL 
OBLIGATION BONDS: STATE LAW, BANKRUPTCY AND DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS i–ii, 1–4 
3
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the form of CABs.  California and Texas school districts administer public 
schools within their geographic areas and are controlled by locally elected 
governing boards.7  There are approximately 1,000 school districts in each 
of these states, each serving anywhere from a few students to hundreds of 
thousands of students.8  
In recent years, California and Texas have been among the states where 
CABs are used most, and in both states, school districts are the most 
frequent issuers of this type of debt, issuing hundreds of millions of dollars 
of these bonds.9  California legislation limiting the use of CABs (AB 182) 
took effect in January 2014.10  Texas legislation with the same purpose 
(HB 114) took effect in September 2015.11  The controversy surrounding 
 
(2014).  This article uses the term to refer to bonds that are supported by an unlimited pledge of ad 
valorem property taxes, but not by other revenues or assets.  Sometimes general obligation bonds are 
referred to as “unlimited tax bonds.”  See Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Unlimited Tax Bond, 
MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., http://www.msrb.org/glossary/definition/unlimited-tax-bond.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/73LJ-DDV4] (defining unlimited tax bonds as “bond[s] payable from ad valorem 
taxes that are not limited by law in rate or amount”).  The analysis in this article draws on technical 
issues discussed in The Bond Lawyer, a publication of the National Association of Bond Lawyers.  
Heather G. White, Catching Too Many “CABs”?, BOND LAW., Winter 2017, at 4. 
7. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 35100–35125 (Deering 2013); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 11.002–
11.0511 (West 2012). 
8. Fingertip Facts on Education in California – CalEdFacts, CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
https://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/sd/cb/ceffingertipfacts.asp [https://perma.cc/8V6V-HWNT]; Largest 
& Smallest Public School Districts – CalEdFacts, CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/sd/cb/ceflargesmalldist.asp [http://perma.cc/HN6C-UW2D]; Snapshot 
2016: District Size, TEX. EDUC. AGENCY, https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/ 
2016/distsize.html [https://perma.cc/AAC2-WAL3] (click each column heading to view school 
districts that fall within the size indicated at the top of each column). 
9. See Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch: Capital Appreciation Bonds May Pressure School 
Districts, (Aug. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Fitch Ratings Press Release], available at 
https://www.fitchratings.com/site/fitch-home/pressrelease?id=759075 [https://perma.cc/7GJG-
CAAY] (noting school districts in rapidly growing states including California and Texas use CABs 
often).  School districts were responsible for 83.6% of the CABs issuances and 64.1% of the principal 
amount issued in California in 2015, and for 87.8% of the issuances and 99.2% of the principal 
amount issued in Texas in the fiscal year that ended on August 31, 2015 (Texas fiscal year 2015), 
based on data from the California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC) and the 
Texas Bond Review Board (TBRB), respectively.  California Issuances 2015 (2016) (unpublished 
data) (on file with author) [hereinafter California Issuances 2015]; Texas Bond Review Board 
Issuances Texas Fiscal Years 2007–2015 (2015) (unpublished data) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
TBRB Issuances FY 2007–2015].  California school districts issued over $700 million original 
principal amount of CABs in 2015, and Texas school districts issued over $200 million in Texas fiscal 
year 2015, based on data from CDIAC and the TBRB.  Id. 
10. Assemb. B. 182, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). 
11. Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 991, §§ 1–3, sec. 1201.0245, 2015 Tex. Gen. 
Laws 3517–3519 (codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1201.0245). 
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CABs that led to AB 182 and HB 114 focused on school districts.12  One 
of the transactions that received considerable attention was the 2011 
issuance of $105 million CABs by the Poway Unified School District in 
California (Poway Transaction).13  No payments are required on these 
bonds until 2033, but nearly $1 billion will be due between 2033 and 
2051.14  While this is an extreme example, it demonstrates the issue that 
exists to varying degrees with all CABs.   
Problems with the framework within which local government debt is 
issued, including those that lead to the misuse of capital appreciation 
bonds, must be addressed because of the important role that local 
government debt plays in public construction in the United States and the 
nation’s looming infrastructure needs.  Adding to the significance of these 
problems is the fact the United States federal government and state 
governments subsidize most local government borrowing.15  The federal 
 
12. See Ian Lovett, California Schools Finance Upgrades by Making the Next Generation  
Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/10/us/10schools.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/ENS6-9DEC] (quoting California Treasurer Bill Lockyer as analogizing the use of 
CABs as “the school district’s version of printing money”); Mark Lisheron, Texas Schools Pass Debt on 
to the Next Generation, WATCHDOG.ORG (Nov. 6, 2013), http://watchdog.org/114596/texas-schools-
pass-debt-next-generation/ [https://perma.cc/5CPP-SAHL] (reporting the filing of bills by Texas 
representatives to modify the use of CABs due to their propensity to be abused); Dan Weikel,  
Risky Bonds Tie Schools to Huge Debt, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2012/nov/29/local/la-me-school-bond-20121129 [https://perma.cc/7HU5-3MJQ] (describing the 
dangers and concerns surrounding CABs).   
13. Will Carless, Where Borrowing $105 Million Will Cost $1 Billion: Poway Schools, VOICE OF SAN 
DIEGO (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/education/where-borrowing-105-
million-will-cost-1-billion-poway-schools/ [https://perma.cc/3DAX-MU7J]; see also Randall Jensen, 
Calif. Capital Appreciation Bonds Have Unintended Consequences, THE BOND BUYER  
(Sept. 20. 2012) [hereinafter Jensen, Calif. Capital Appreciation Bonds Have Unintended Consequences], 
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/121_183/california-school-districts-capital-appreciation-bonds-
consequences-1044196-1.html [https://perma.cc/QSE8-C4KD] (stating the Poway Schools’ 
$105 million bond will “require nearly $1 billion in debt service at their 40-year maturity”); Lovett, 
supra note 12 (“And in the most expensive case yet, the Poway Unified School District borrowed 
$105 million to finish modernizing older school buildings, which local property owners will be paying 
off until four decades from now at an eventual cost of nearly $1 billion.”); Weikel, supra note 12 (“By 
the maturity date of 2051, however, the $105 million in Poway notes will cost district taxpayers 
almost $1 billion in principal and interest[—]more than $9 for every $1 borrowed.”). 
14. POWAY UNIFIED SCH. DIST., $105,000,149.70 GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS OF 
SCHOOL FACILITIES IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 2007-1 OF THE POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 2008 ELECTION, SERIES B (SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA) 13 (2011) [hereinafter 
POWAY UNIFIED SCH. DIST., 2011 OFFICIAL STATEMENT], http://64.79.135.236/docs/SFID% 
20No.%202007-1,%20GOB%202008%20Series%20B.pdf [https://perma.cc/U98Y-GTFE]. 
15. GRANT A. DRIESSEN, Summary to CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30638, TAX-EXEMPT 
BONDS: A DESCRIPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT (2016) (“The federal 
5
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government reduces the cost to state and local governments of issuing 
debt by making interest earnings on most of such debt exempt from 
federal income tax.16  Tax-exempt debt typically bears interest at a lower 
rate than taxable debt of identical credit quality because lenders receive the 
benefit of tax exemption.17  Interest on most state and local government 
debt is also exempt from home state taxation.18   
Part II of this article provides general background information, 
including a brief introduction to local government bonds (also referred to 
as “municipal bonds”), the key legal limits that apply to these bonds 
(particularly to California and Texas school district general obligation 
bonds), and the differences between capital appreciation bonds and other 
local government bonds.  Part III discusses the most significant problems 
associated with the use of long-term CABs, including concerns about 
interperiod equity, costs, and transparency.  Some of the factors that 
appear to contribute to the use of CABs despite these problems are 
canvassed in Part IV.  Part V outlines recent legislation adopted in 
California and Texas to limit the use of CABs and highlights similarities 
and differences in the approaches taken in these two states.  Finally, 
Part VI sets out the potential means to prevent misuse of CABs.  The 
lessons this article draws from the California and Texas school district 
experience with CABs can be applied to local governments generally.   
 
government subsidizes the cost of most state and local debt by excluding the interest income from 
federal income taxation.”). 
16. Traditionally, the vast majority of state and local government securities are issued on a tax-
exempt basis.  U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 11 
(2012).  In 2015, the loss of federal tax revenue (also referred to as a “tax expenditure”)—resulting 
from the exemption from income of interest on public purpose tax-exempt bonds—was 
$29.4 billion.  GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30638, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: A 
DESCRIPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 3 (2016). 
17. See GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30638, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: A 
DESCRIPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 1 (2016) (detailing the benefits of tax-
exempt bonds).   
18. State Tax Treatment of Municipal Bonds: 2012, THE BOND BUYER (Aug. 5, 2013) (on file with 
author). 
6
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II.    INTRODUCTION TO MUNICIPAL BONDS 
A. Overview 
There are more than 90,000 local governments in the United States, 
including more than 12,500 school districts.19  State and local 
governments (including school districts) put in place $258.5 billion of new 
non-residential construction and improvements in 2016, including 
$41.3 billion for primary and secondary school facilities.20  Much of this 
construction is financed with state and local government debt.21  In 2015, 
state and local governments issued $403.6 billion of debt with maturities of 
at least thirteen months, and a total of approximately $3.7 trillion of state 
and local government debt was outstanding (including debt issued in prior 
years).22  Most of this is in the form of “bonds.”23  This term generally is 
used to refer to local government debt securities with a maturity of more 
than three years;24 most bonds have a significantly longer term, frequently 
up to thirty years and, sometimes, even longer.25 
Local governments, including California and Texas school districts, 
issue bonds primarily to finance capital projects (“new money bonds”) and 
 
19. CARMA HOGUE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NO. G12-CG-ORG, GOVERNMENT 
ORGANIZATION SUMMARY REPORT: 2012, at 1 (2013), http://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/ 
g12_org.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3CH-LSSY]. 
20. Annual Value of State and Local Construction Put in Place 2008–2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/construction/c30/historical_data.html [https://perma.cc/BN8W-LS7G].  
The federal government only put in place $21.9 billion of similar projects in 2016.  Id. 
21. GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30638, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: A 
DESCRIPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 1 (2016).   
22. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, 2016 FACT BOOK 29, 33 (2016), 
http://www2.sifma.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=8589963035 [https://perma.cc/5VPH-
R686].  Local government borrowing to finance capital improvements had become customary by the 
early 1900s.  A.M. HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDS: A CENTURY OF EXPERIENCE 32 (photo 
reprint 1975) (1936). 
23. GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30638, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: A 
DESCRIPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 4 (2016).   
24. Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Bond, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., 
http://www.msrb.org/glossary.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z887-56QB].  In some cases, “bonds” may 
have a term shorter than three years.  Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Short Term or Short Term 
Range, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/SHORT-TERM-
OR-SHORT-TERM-RANGE.aspx [https://perma.cc/7Z7R-WQUM].  Local governments also 
issue “notes,” which generally have a shorter term.  Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms:  
Note, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/NOTE.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/J3A6-UWNH]. 
25. Bond, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bond.asp [https://perma. 
cc/L2H3-FHAT] (“Bond maturities can range from a day or less to more than 30 years.”). 
7
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to refinance previously issued bonds (“refunding bonds”).26  Principal and 
interest (“debt service”)27 on municipal bonds may be paid from a single 
source or a combination of sources, including property taxes, sales taxes or 
other taxes; the local government issuer’s general fund; or revenues from a 
particular project. 
Most debt issued by school districts in California and Texas is in the 
form of general obligation bonds, several billion dollars of which are 
issued annually in each state.28  These bonds are the focus of this article.  
Principal and interest on California and Texas school district general 
obligation bonds are payable from ad valorem real property tax assessments 
that are levied solely for this purpose.29  Ad valorem property taxes are 
calculated as a percentage of property value.30  These taxes generally are 
collected shortly before debt service is due.31  Most, but not all, Texas 
school district general obligation bonds are also guaranteed under the 
Texas Permanent School Fund Bond Guarantee Program.32  
 
26. STEVE MAGUIRE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41735, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
DEBT: AN ANALYSIS 2 (2011).  Local governments also borrow to finance operating expenses.  Id.  
This is less common and is generally accomplished with shorter-term notes rather than with bonds.  
Id; see Policy Basics: State and Local Borrowing, CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Jan. 15, 
2015), https://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-state-and-local-borrowing [https://perma.cc/ 
7KAC-5M7P] (“Almost all state and local bond debt is long-term debt incurred to pay for capital 
expenditures . . . not to cover operating expenses.”).  Proceeds of California and Texas school district 
general obligation bonds cannot be used to pay operating expenses.  See infra Section II. B., 
“Permitted Uses of Proceeds.” 
27. Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Debt Service, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING  
BD., http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/DEBT-SERVICE.aspx [https://perma.cc/7PPD-
ML6E]. 
28. In calendar year 2015, California school districts issued approximately $10.4 billion of 
general obligation bonds (out of $11.6 billion of total school district debt).  CAL. DEBT AND INV. 
ADVISORY COMM’N, CDIAC No. 16.09, 2015 SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLIC DEBT ISSUANCE 
1-3 (2015) [hereinafter CDIAC, 2015 SUMMARY], http://www.sto.ca.gov/cdiac/reports/annual/ 
2015/summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4GZ-856K].  Texas school districts issued approximately 
$14.5 billion of general obligation bonds (out of $14.6 billion of total school district debt) in Texas 
fiscal year 2016.  TEX. BOND REVIEW BD., 2016 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANNUAL REPORT 40 (2016) 
[hereinafter TBRB, 2016 REPORT], www.brb.state.tx.us/pub/lgs/fy2016/2016LocalARFinal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QZM3-XXTK].  
29. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15250 (Deering 2013); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 45.003(b)(1) 
(West 2012). 
30. CAL. DEBT AND INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, CDIAC. NO. 06-04, CALIFORNIA DEBT 
ISSUANCE PRIMER, at C-2 (2006) [hereinafter CDIAC PRIMER], http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/ 
cdiac/debtpubs/primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/RF46-N72N]. 
31. CAL. EDUC. § 15250; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 26.04 (West Supp. 2017).   
32. Of the $73.8 billion of outstanding general obligation bonds and limited tax bonds of 
Texas school districts as of August 31, 2016, $68.3 billion was guaranteed by the program.  TBRB, 
8
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Bonds are usually issued in a group (referred to as a series) with 
different maturities.  Sometimes a single issuance consists of more than 
one series, particularly when the bonds being issued have different 
characteristics, such as having been approved by voters at different 
elections, being issued for different purposes, or having different tax-
exempt status.33   
B. Restrictions on Debt 
Most states have constitutional restrictions, statutory restrictions, or 
both on the amount and terms of debt that local governments within their 
borders may issue.34  These restrictions are intended to serve a variety of 
purposes, including promoting fiscally sound decision-making, reducing 
the risk of default, preventing excessive burdens on taxpayers, and 
promoting interperiod equity (the concept that the burden of paying for a 
facility should be spread fairly over the period during which the facility is 
used).35   
 
2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 37, 47.  The Texas Permanent School Fund was established to benefit 
Texas public schools.  Bonds guaranteed by the fund receive the highest ratings from all three 
agencies that rate municipal bonds.  TEX. EDUC. AGENCY, TEXAS PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT FOR BOND GUARANTEE PROGRAM 1, 17 (June 28, 2017) [hereinafter 
TEXAS PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND DISCLOSURE STATEMENT], http://tea.texas.gov/WorkArea/ 
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=51539615528 [https://perma.cc/23BR-2G52] (click “I Agree”). 
33. See, e.g., SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST., $65,434,441.70 SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL 
DISTRICT 2012 GENERAL OBLIGATION REFUNDING BONDS (DEDICATED UNLIMITED AD 
VALOREM PROPERTY TAX BONDS) SERIES R-1, $56,869,830 SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL 
DISTRICT 2012 OBLIGATION REFUNDING BONDS (DEDICATED UNLIMITED AD VALOREM 
PROPERTY TAX BONDS) SERIES R-2, http://emma.msrb.org/EP611468-EP478356-EP878739.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K99D-RQDN] (showing an example of two series of bonds as part of a single 
issuance). 
34. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, M-186, STATE 
LAWS GOVERNING LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 10 (1993) 
(describing the prevalence of several types of restrictions); Paul G. Farnham, Re-examining Local Debt 
Limits: A Disaggregated Analysis, 51 S. ECON. J. 1186, 1187 (1985) (noting all but five states have 
restrictions on the use of debt by local governments); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 1241, 1255–56 (2009) (“Virtually every state constitution imposes limits on the amount of 
debt that its political subdivisions can issue in order to fund capital projects . . . .”); James E. Spiotto, 
The Role of the State in Supervising and Assisting Municipalities, Especially in Times of Financial Distress, MUN. 
FIN. J., Spring 2013, at 1, 6–8 (discussing the limits states have placed on the debt municipalities may 
issue). 
35. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL DEBT 37–39 (1961) (identifying 
reasons for restrictions, including potential negative impacts of excessive debt on the borrowing 
government, other local governments and the state); Gillette, supra note 34, at 255–56 (discussing the 
reasons debt limitations were created, including protecting taxpayers and promoting interperiod 
9
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Debt limits take different forms, such as requirements for voter 
approval—often supermajority approval—limits on the amount of total 
debt, and limits on the tax rate expected to be levied to service debt.36  In 
addition, states typically impose constraints on the structure and terms of 
debt and on the purposes for which bond proceeds—the amount received 
by the issuer, consisting of the principal amount of the bonds plus original 
issue premium or minus original issue discount37—can be used.  The 
restrictions that apply to California and Texas school district general 
obligation bonds are described below. 
Voter Approval Requirements.  Both California and Texas require 
voter approval of school district general obligation new money bonds.38   
School districts in California may obtain voter approval under either of 
two authorization regimes.39  The California Constitution generally 
requires that general obligation bonds, issued by a local government, be 
approved by two-thirds of the residents in the local government’s territory 
voting on the matter (referred to in this article as the “California Two-
Thirds Regime”).40  A provision was added to the California Constitution 
in late 2000 that allows school districts to issue general obligation bonds to 
finance school facilities with the approval of 55% of the residents of the 
district voting on the matter (referred to in this article as the “California 
55% Regime”).41  Obtaining the approval of 55% of the voters is much 
easier than obtaining approval of 2/3 of the voters.42  As a result, virtually 
 
equity); Spiotto, supra, note 34 at 10 (identifying prevention of financial crises and defaults as a reason 
for the imposition of debt limits). 
36. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 35, at 27 
(noting there are numerous types of restrictions on borrowing; and highlighting limits on the amount 
of debt, tax rates, and voter approval requirements); Farnham, supra note 34, at 1187 (identifying 
limits on the amount of debt and referendum requirements as the two major types of restrictions on 
debt). 
37. See infra section II.D. (discussing original issue premium and original issue discount).   
38. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3(e); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. 
§ 45.003(a) (West 2012).  
39. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 18. 
40. Id. art. XVI, § 18(a).  
41. Id. art. XVI, § 18(b).  Community college districts and county offices of education can also 
obtain approval under the California 55% Regime, but other local governments cannot.  Id. 
42. While 79.4% of local educational bond measures presented to voters from 2001 through 
2014 (including both California 55% Regime and California Two-Thirds Regime measures) passed; 
the success rate would have been only 36.9% if the California 55% Regime had not been available.  
KEVIN DAYTON, CAL. POLICY CTR., FOR THE KIDS: CALIFORNIA VOTERS MUST BECOME WARY 
OF BORROWING BILLIONS MORE FROM WEALTHY INVESTORS FOR EDUCATIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION 16 (2015). 
10
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all voter authorizations for school district bonds since 2001 have been 
obtained under the California 55% Regime.43  Districts occasionally still 
use the California Two-Thirds Regime, however, because of the additional 
requirements imposed under the California 55% Regime.44   
To issue general obligation new money bonds, Texas school districts 
must obtain the approval of a majority of the residents of the district 
voting at an election held for that purpose.45  Once voter approval is 
obtained, bonds often are issued in multiple issuances over a period of 
several years.46   
Expected Tax Rate Limits.  In addition to voter authorization 
requirements, both California and Texas restrict the issuance of school 
district bonds by imposing limits on the tax rates for debt service that are 
expected to result (referred to herein as “expected rate limits”); though the 
California limits do not apply as broadly as the ones in Texas, as discussed 
below.   
California school districts may issue new money bonds approved under 
the California 55% Regime, only if the tax rate expected to be needed—to 
pay debt service on bonds approved at a single election—does not exceed 
$30 per $100,000 of assessed valuation for elementary school districts and 
high school districts, or $60 per $100,000 for unified school districts 
(which include both elementary and high schools) in any year through the 
maturity of the bonds.47  This restriction does not apply to bonds 
approved under the California Two-Thirds Regime.48  Further, since the 
expected rate limit applies to bonds approved at a single election only, 
school districts can go back to voters at a subsequent election and ask 
 
43. Only 110 of the 1,147 local educational bond measures presented to voters from 2001 
through 2014 were under the California Two-Thirds Regime.  Id. 
44. These requirements include the expected rate limit described infra at notes 47–50 and 
accompanying text, and the formation of a citizens’ oversight committee, among others.  CAL. EDUC. 
CODE §§ 15264–15288 (Deering 2013). 
45. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3(e); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 45.003(a) (West 2012). 
46. See CAL. DEBT AND INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, CDIAC NO. 14-01, K-14 VOTER 
APPROVED GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS: AUTHORIZED, BUT UNISSUED 1–2 (2014)  
[hereinafter CDIAC, VOTER APPROVED GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS: AUTHORIZED BUT 
UNISSUED] (indicating school districts issue their bonds for as many as 5-10 years after voter 
approval is obtained); Bonds 101: Questions and Answers, MY TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOL, 
https://www.mytexaspublicschool.org/The-School-System/Funding/Bonds-101-Questions-and-
Answers.aspx [https://perma.cc/B9XA-62FS] (noting bonds may be sold in multiple sales over a 
period of time). 
47. CAL. EDUC. §§ 15268, 15270(a). 
48. Id. 
11
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them to reauthorize the bonds, effectively doubling the limit.  In fact, at 
least eleven school districts obtained reauthorization from voters in 2012, 
and at least another three did so in 2014.49  However, district officials may 
be reluctant to seek additional voter approval for a variety of reasons, 
including: because they do not believe they will obtain it; because they see 
a significant political cost to requesting the approval; or because they need 
to issue bonds quickly.50  
The Texas limit, in contrast, applies to all general obligation bonds 
issued by a school district and cannot be modified by the voters in the 
district.51  Texas law requires that, before a school district issues general 
obligation new money bonds, it must demonstrate that it has “a projected 
ability to pay the principal of and interest on the proposed bonds and all 
previously issued bonds . . . from a tax at a rate not to exceed $0.50 per 
$100 of valuation” (adjusted to $0.45 per $100 for subsequent bond 
issuances in some circumstances as described in the following 
paragraph).52 
Both California and Texas school districts must comply with expected 
rate limits at the time bonds are issued.53  Should a higher tax rate 
ultimately be necessary to pay debt service, the higher tax must be 
levied.54  Texas law allows expected rate limits to be calculated based on 
either historic assessed valuations or projections within specified 
 
49. See INST. FOR SOC. RESEARCH, CTR. FOR CAL. STUDIES, CAL. STATE UNIV., 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA COUNTY, CITY AND SCHOOL DISTRICT ELECTION OUTCOMES, 2012 
ELECTIONS, SCHOOL DISTRICT OFFICES AND BALLOT MEASURES 19–38 [hereinafter INST. FOR 
SOC. RESEARCH, 2012 ELECTIONS], http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/county-city-school-district-
election-results/2012/school-district-report-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2X3-JM6A] (providing the 
data from which these figures were derived); INST. FOR SOC. RESEARCH, CTR. FOR CAL. STUDIES, 
CAL. STATE UNIV., SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA COUNTY, CITY AND SCHOOL DISTRICT ELECTION 
OUTCOMES, 2014 ELECTIONS, SCHOOL DISTRICT OFFICES AND BALLOT MEASURES 19–39 
[hereinafter INST. FOR SOC. RESEARCH, 2014 ELECTIONS], http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov//county-
city-school-district-election-results/2014/schooldistrict-report-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TR2-
FE5G] (providing additional data needed for these statistics); see, e.g., DALE SCOTT, WIN WIN: AN 
INSIDER’S GUIDE TO SCHOOL BONDS 108–09 (2013) (describing an example of school bond 
elections). 
50. The election process takes time, and bonds may be approved under the California 55% 
Regime only at statewide election or at a regularly scheduled local election (typically in June and 
November).  CAL. EDUC. § 15266(a) (Deering 2013). 
51. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 45.0031(a) (West 2012). 
52. Id. § 45.003.  Districts may include state assistance that can legally be used for debt service.  
Id. 
53. CAL. EDUC. §§ 15268, 15270(a); TEX. EDUC. § 45.0031(a). 
54. CAL. EDUC. § 15250 (Deering 2013); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 26.04 (West Supp. 2017). 
12
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parameters.55  If a district uses projections and the tax rate necessary to 
pay debt service ultimately exceeds the expected rate limit, the limit is 
adjusted to $0.45 for subsequent issuances.56  California law provides no 
specific guidance on how to determine compliance and no penalty if actual 
rates are higher than the limit.57   
California Limit on Debt as a Percentage of Assessed Valuation.  
California school districts may not issue general obligation new money 
bonds if the total principal amount of general obligation bonds 
outstanding after the issuance would exceed 1.25% of the assessed value of 
taxable property of the district (2.50% for unified school districts).58  
These caps can be—and in fact are—sometimes waived by the California 
State Board of Education.59  While requests for waivers of this limit are 
relatively infrequent, they are typically granted.60  
Other Restrictions on Structure and Terms of Debt.  California and 
Texas also impose statutory restrictions on the structure and terms of 
school district general obligation new money bonds.  For example, these 
bonds may be outstanding for no more than 40 years in either state, with 
shorter maximum terms for CABs as a result of the passage of AB 182 and 
HB 114.61  The maximum interest rate and maximum yield (taking into 
account original issue discount) for general obligation bonds issued by 
California school districts is 12% (8% for CABs as a result of AB 182).62  
While in Texas, the maximum net effective interest rate (taking into 
account original issue premium, discount and compounding of interest) is 
15%.63  Different restrictions apply to refunding bonds.64   
 
55. TEX. EDUC. §§ 45.0031(b)–(c) (West 2012).  Most districts use historic assessed 
valuations.  See infra note 201. 
56. TEX. EDUC. § 45.0031(e) (West 2012). 
57. CAL. EDUC. §§ 15268, 15270(a). 
58. Id. §§ 15102, 15106, 15268, 15270(a).  
59. DAYTON, supra note 42, at 44. 
60. Of fifty-one requests made between 2000 and 2014, forty-eight were approved and three 
were withdrawn.  Id. at 45.  In contrast, the Board of Education has never granted a waiver of the 
expected rate limit.  July 2016 Agenda Item #W-10 3, CAL. STATE BD. OF EDUC. (2015), 
http://www.cde.ca.gov/be/ag/ag/yr16/agenda201607.asp [https://perma.cc/78UT-SW3S]. 
61. CAL. EDUC. § 15144 (Deering 2013); CAL. GOV’T §§ 53508(f), 53508.5 (Deering 2011 & 
Supp. 2017); TEX. EDUC. § 45.001(b) (West 2012); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 1201.0245(b)(1) 
(West Supp. 2017).  See infra Section V for discussion of AB 182 and HB 114. 
62. CAL. EDUC. § 15143 (Deering 2013); CAL. GOV’T §§ 53508(d), 53508.5, 53531, 53532 
(Deering 2011 & Supp. 2017). 
63. TEX. GOV’T § 1204.006 (West 2013); see also id. §§ 1204.003, 1204.004, 1204.005 (setting 
forth computations). 
13
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Bonds that are issued on a tax-exempt basis (that is, bonds the interest 
on which is excluded from income for federal income tax purposes) are 
also subject to extensive requirements under the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 and related regulations.65  These requirements are intended to ensure 
that proceeds of tax-exempt bonds are used for purposes and activities 
deemed appropriate by the U.S. Congress and to prevent local 
governments from issuing more tax-exempt bonds than they need, issuing 
the bonds too far in advance of the time proceeds are used, or allowing the 
bonds to remain unpaid for longer than is necessary.66   
Permitted Uses of Proceeds.  California and Texas school districts 
may use general obligation bond proceeds only for certain purposes. 
School districts generally may use proceeds of bonds approved under 
the California Two-Thirds Regime to acquire, construct and improve 
school lots and facilities.67  Bonds issued under the California 55% 
Regime also may be used to finance furniture and equipment.68  California 
districts are further limited to financing projects that are described in the 
bond measure approved by the voters.69  In addition to paying direct 
project costs, districts may use bond proceeds to pay the costs of the bond 
issuance (including fees paid to financial advisors, underwriters, and 
lawyers) and capitalized interest (interest on the bonds prior to expected 
completion of the project or soon thereafter).70  California school districts 
may not use general obligation bond proceeds for operating expenses.71 
Texas school districts generally may use proceeds of general obligation 
bonds to construct, acquire, improve and equip school sites and facilities, 
and to acquire school buses.72  Districts may also use proceeds to pay 
 
64. The most relevant of these restrictions in California and Texas are described in Sections 
V.A., V.B., and V.C., infra. 
65. 26 U.S.C. §§ 103, 141–150 (2012); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OFFICE OF TAX 
EXEMPT BONDS, PUBLICATION 4079 TAX-EXEMPT GOVERNMENTAL BONDS (2016) (providing a 
summary of some of the United States Treasury regulations that apply to tax-exempt bonds). 
66. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX 
REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 1151–56 (1987), http://www.jct.gov/jcs-10-87.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
CB7U-YWP3] (discussing the reasons for the Tax Reform Act of 1986). 
67. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(b)(2); CAL. EDUC. § 15100 (Deering 2013). 
68. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(b)(3); id. art. XVI, § 18(b); CAL. EDUC. §§ 15100, 15266(b) 
(Deering 2013). 
69. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(b)(3); id. art. XVI, § 18(b); CAL. EDUC. § 15122 (Deering 
2013); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53410 (Deering 2011). 
70. CAL. EDUC. §§ 15146(h), (j) (Deering 2016). 
71. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1(b)(2), 1(b)(3)(A); CAL. EDUC. §§ 15100, 15266(b). 
72. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 45.001(a) (West 2012). 
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costs of issuance and capitalized interest.73  Proceeds may not be used to 
pay operating expenses.74  Texas districts, like those in California, are 
limited to financing projects that are within the scope approved by the 
voters.75   
C. Repayment of Principal 
Typically, principal of each bond is paid at maturity or over a period of 
years leading up to maturity.76  However, because bonds are usually issued 
in a series with multiple maturities, principal payments are typically made 
over the life of a series of bonds, though the amount of such payments 
may vary from year to year.77 
D. Return on Investment 
Municipal bonds provide return to investors in the form of interest, 
original issue discount, or both.78  The interest rate on the bonds may be 
 
73. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 1201.042(a), (d) (West Supp. 2017). 
74. This prohibition has one limited exception that allows for the operation of the facility 
itself during construction and for one year after.  Id. § 1201.042(a). 
75. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(b)(3); id. art. XVI, § 18(b); CAL. EDUC. § 15122 (Deering 
2013); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53410 (Deering 2011); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 52.072(e)(1)(B) 
(West Supp. 2016); TEX. GOV’T § 1201.042(e) (West Supp. 2017). 
76. When principal is required to be paid over a period of years leading up to maturity, the 
principal payments are referred to as “mandatory sinking fund payments” and the bonds are referred 
to as being subject to “mandatory sinking fund redemption” in the amount of the payments.  See 
TBRB, 2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 126 (defining a term bond and how payments are made).  
Payments are allocated to investors by lot, meaning the bondholders do not know in advance which 
holders will be repaid early.  See, e.g., MOJAVE UNIFIED SCH. DIST. $8,040,000 GENERAL 
OBLIGATION BONDS OF SCHOOL FACILITIES IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 1 OF THE MOJAVE 
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT (KERN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA) ELECTION OF 2014, SERIES 2015, 
at F-2 (2015) [hereinafter MOJAVE ISD 2015 OFFICIAL STATEMENT], http://emma.msrb.org/ 
ER913004-ER713242-ER1114694.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6PY-TR86] (describing selection of 
bonds for redemption as “randomly” and “by lot”); SCHERTZ-CIBOLO-UNIVERSAL CITY INDEP. 
SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 2014, at 4, 8 (2014), 
https://emma.msrb.org/EP831962-EP644201-EP1045821.pdf [https://perma.cc/AE26-L62A] 
(describing the selection of bonds for redemption “by lot”). 
77. See Andrew Ang & Richard C. Green, Discussion Paper, Lowering Borrowing Costs for States 
and Municipalities Through CommonMuni, HAMILTON PROJECT, Feb. 2011, at 10 (“Since 1995, the 
average municipal bond series has contained thirteen separate bonds . . . .”). 
78. Investors may also earn capital gains if they trade municipal bonds in the secondary 
market, but this does not directly affect local government issuers, and, therefore, is not a focus of this 
article.  See What to Expect When Selling Municipal Bonds Before Maturity, MSRB, http://www.msrb.org/ 
msrb1/EMMA/pdfs/Selling-Before-Maturity.pdf [https://perma.cc/WRG8-N3L2] (describing 
factors that can affect the price of bonds in the secondary market). 
15
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set at a fixed rate at the time they are issued: a rate that changes 
periodically based on market conditions or a predetermined index.79  
Virtually all California school district general obligation bonds bear interest 
at a fixed rate, and only a very small percentage of Texas school district 
general obligation bonds do not.  Some local government bonds are sold 
at a discount from their stated principal amount, meaning the investor 
pays less than the face amount of the bond.80  This discount is referred to 
as “original issue discount.”81  Original issue discount has the effect of 
increasing the yield on the bond (the return to the investor) above the 
nominal interest rate.82  
Most of the time, local governments issue bonds on which they pay 
interest periodically (usually semiannually) throughout the term of each 
bond.83  Bonds on which interest is required to be paid in this manner are 
referred to as “current interest bonds” or “CIBs.”84  Sometimes, local 
governments, instead, issue bonds of the type that are the focus of this 
paper—CABs—on which interest is added to principal (“compounded” or 
“accreted”) periodically rather than being paid.85  The compounded 
 
79. Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Fixed Rate, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING  
BD., http://msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/FIXED-RATE.aspx [https://perma.cc/4YXK-GTV2]; 
Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Variable Rate, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., 
http://msrb.org/glossary/definition/variable-rate.aspx [https://perma.cc/82ZN-Y63R]. 
80. CDIAC PRIMER, supra note 30, at C-18. 
81. Id.; Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Original Issue Discount Bond or OID Bond, MUN.  
SEC. RULEMAKING BD., http://msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/ORIGINAL-ISSUE-DISCOUNT-
BOND-OR-OID-BOND.aspx [https://perma.cc/JG97-GZFM]. 
82. The Underwriting Process, MSRB EDUCATION CENTER, http://www.msrb.org/ 
EducationCenter/Municipal-Market/Lifecycle/Primary/Underwriting-Process.aspx [https://perma. 
cc/FG5D-2FJE]. 
83. See John E. Petersen, Innovations in Tax-Exempt Instruments and Transactions, NAT’L  
TAX J., Dec. 1991, at 11, 15 (describing the traditional bond payment structure); ORANGE CTY.  
GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS—THE UNTOLD STORY OF ASSESSED VALUES 7 (2014)  
[hereinafter ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS], http://www.ocgrandjury.org/pdfs/ 
2013_2014_GJreport/BondsReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/XUP9-84GV] (“A CIB typically pays the 
interest due twice a year and the principal is repaid either at the end of the term of the bond or in a 
series of annual principal payments toward the end of the term of the bond.”). 
84. See ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83, at 7 (describing the 
CIB). 
85. Local governments also issue “convertible capital appreciation bonds,” which are a hybrid 
of current interest bonds and capital appreciation bonds.  Bond sales: Questions and  
Considerations for Districts, CAL. SCH. BDS. ASS’N, https://www.csba.org/GovernanceAndPolicy 
Resources/~/media/CSBA/Files/GovernanceResources/GovernanceBriefs/201212GBBondSales.a
shx [https://perma.cc/KE6P-8GEP].  Interest on these bonds compounds until a specified 
conversion date, then is paid periodically on the sum of the original principal amount plus the 
16
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interest itself then bears interest until it is paid, together with principal, at 
maturity.86  The sum of the principal plus the compounded interest to be 
paid at maturity is referred to as the “maturity amount” or “maturity 
value” of the CAB.87 
It is common for local governments to issue bonds with a small amount 
of original issue discount (typically—though not always—less than 3%).88  
Local governments today rarely issue deeply discounted bonds, including 
“zero coupon bonds,” on which no interest is paid and all return on 
investment is in the form of original issue discount, though they did so 
more frequently in the early 1980s.89  Zero coupon bonds are the 
economic equivalent of CABs and have largely been replaced by CABs, 
primarily because of differences in their treatment in calculating 
compliance with debt limits.90  
California and Texas school districts often issue general obligation 
bonds at a premium, meaning the investor pays more than the face 
amount of the bond and the yield on the bond is lower than the nominal 
 
interest compounded through the conversion date.  These raise the same concerns as CABs, though 
to a lesser degree, and are not addressed separately in this article.  See SCOTT, supra note 49, at 22 
(describing convertible CABs, and indicating they are a variation of CABs). 
86. See 2015–2016 L.A. CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY, CAPITAL APPRECIATION BONDS  
AND OTHER SCHOOL BOND DEBT: CONSEQUENCES OF POOR FINANCIAL PRACTICES FINAL 
REPORT 105 (2016) [hereinafter L.A. CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY REPORT], http://grandjury. 
co.la.ca.us/pdf/LOSANGELESCOUNTY2015-2016CIVILGRANDJURYFINALREPORT.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C25B-8ELF] (“CABs are a repayment structure similar to both U.S. Savings 
Bonds and what in the mortgage industry is called a ‘balloon loan,’ where all principal and interest is 
due at maturity.”); see also ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83, at 7 
(explaining the interest on a CAB is not paid until maturity).  Principal and interest are sometimes 
paid near maturity for bonds subject to mandatory sinking fund redemption.  See supra note 76 
(explaining this concept). 
87. Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Maturity Value, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., 
http://msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/MATURITY-VALUE.aspx [https://perma.cc/BJB2-6LMQ]. 
88. See CDIAC PRIMER, supra note 30, at C-18 (noting bonds with discounts in excess of two 
or three percent are “deep discount bonds”). 
89. See Alan Walter Steiss, New Financing Instruments for State and Local Capital Facilities, PUB. 
BUDGETING & FIN., Fall 1988, at 24, 28 (indicating zero coupon municipal bonds were introduced 
in the late 1970s and became popular soon thereafter); Robert Metz, Market Place: Zero-Coupon 
Municipals, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/31/business/market-
place-zero-coupon-municipals.html [https://perma.cc/5SNA-VPNK] (asserting the first major issue 
of zero coupon municipal bonds was in 1982).   
90. See infra Section III.C. 
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interest rate.91  This results in additional proceeds—sometimes substantial 
additional proceeds (particularly in Texas)—from the financing.92   
A single issuance of bonds may include both current interest bonds and 
capital appreciation bonds, and also a combination of bonds issued at a 
discount, at face value, and at a premium.93   
III.    THE TROUBLE WITH CABS 
The use of CABs causes three significant problems.  First, CABs allow 
local governments to benefit today’s taxpayers at the expense of 
tomorrow’s.  This is inconsistent with the concept of interperiod equity.  
Second, CABs generally have higher yields than current interest bonds.  
Lastly, because compounded interest on CABs is not counted against state 
constitutional and statutory debt limits—that are based on the total 
amount of debt that can be issued or outstanding—the use of CABs 
encourages the perception that less debt is being incurred than is, in fact, 
the case.  
A. CABs Are Incompatible with Interperiod Equity 
In the context of local government debt issued to finance capital 
projects, “interperiod equity” or “intergenerational equity” is the concept 
that the burden of paying taxes to finance a facility should be spread fairly 
over the period during which taxpayers benefit from the facility.94  
 
91. See Jason Chung, Selling at Premium: How School Districts Can Pay Costs of Issuance, FIELDMAN 
ROLAPP & ASSOCIATES SCH. FIN. NEWS (Oct. 2012) (on file with author) (“For many years 
California school districts have generated extra upfront cash from their bond proceeds by 
purposefully inflating their coupon rates for the investors who end up purchasing these premium 
bonds.”); TEX. BOND REVIEW BD., CAB SUMMARY REPORT 1 (2016), www.brb. 
state.tx.us/pub/lgs/fy2016/CABs%20Summary%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5V3M-5AVU] 
(describing the practice of issuing general obligation bonds in the form of CABs at a premium). 
92. California law does not permit premium to be used for project costs.  CAL. EDUC. CODE 
§ 15146 (Deering 2016).  While there has been criticism of the practice, premiums have been 
sometimes used to pay issuance costs.  Chung, supra note 91; Letter from Kamala D. Harris, Att’y 
Gen., State of Cal., to Wendy H. Wiles, Robert E. Anslow & Jeffrey A. Hoskinson, Bowie, Arneson, 
Wiles & Giannone (Mar. 11, 2011) (on file with author).  Texas law permits premium to be used for 
any costs related to the purpose for which the bonds were issued.  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 1201.042(d)(4) (West 2013).  Furthermore, Texas law caps the principal amount of school district 
general obligation refunding bonds at the principal amount of the bonds being refinanced.  See infra 
Section IV.F. for discussion of how this encourages the use of premium CABs. 
93. TBRB, 2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 11, 41, 106. 
94. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 693 (4th ed. 1984); M. David Gelfand, Seeking Local Government Financial Integrity Through 
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Achieving interperiod equity is one of the justifications for financing 
capital projects by borrowing, rather than by requiring, current taxpayers 
to pay the full cost of a facility that will be used for many years.95  But 
interperiod equity also is violated if future taxpayers are required to pay a 
disproportionate share of the cost of a project.96   
Spreading the costs of facilities fairly over their lives encourages an 
optimal, or closer to optimal, level of investment in capital improvements.  
Requiring facilities to be paid for with current revenues is likely to result in 
too few capital improvements.97  Conversely, “the ability to shift the costs 
forward may . . . induce elected officials to incur too much debt,” because 
“they can get the credit for the new project immediately, while the blame 
for the additional taxes needed to pay off the debt will be borne by their 
successors.”98  
Because property taxes to pay debt service on general obligation bonds 
generally are not levied until near the time these amounts must be paid, 
any structure—under which the bulk of the debt service is not due until at 
or near maturity (a “back-loaded” structure)—disproportionately burdens 
 
Debt Ceilings, Tax Limitations, and Expenditure Limits: The New York City Fiscal Crisis, the Taxpayers’ Revolt, 
and Beyond, 63 MINN. L. REV. 545, 550-51 (1979). 
95. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 94, at 693–94; Maria Emilia Freire, Managing 
External Resources, in MUNICIPAL FINANCES: A HANDBOOK FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 325, 327 
(Catherine Farvacque-Vitkovic & Mihaly Kopanyi, eds. 2014); Richard Briffault, Foreword: The 
Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 917 (2003); 
Gelfand, supra note 94, at 550–51; Lori Raineri & Darien Shanske, Municipal Finance and Asymmetric 
Risk, 4 BELMONT L. REV. 65, 69 (2017).  Using debt to spread the cost of a project over its life is not 
a new idea.  See JOHN A. FAIRLIE, MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION 330 (1910) (“At the present time 
the municipal debts are incurred for the erection of permanent works, so as to distribute the cost of 
construction over the period for which the works will be in existence.”). 
96. Gelfand, supra note 94, at 550. 
97. See GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30638, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: A 
DESCRIPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 1 (2016) (noting paying for facilities 
when they are built “is likely to result in a less than optimal rate of public capital formation”); Raineri 
& Shanske, supra note 95, at 69 (arguing if capital projects are funded only with current revenue, large 
capital projects “could hardly ever be built”). 
98. Briffault, supra  note 95, at 917–18; see also ROBERT S. AMDURSKY ET AL., MUNICIPAL 
DEBT FINANCE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 207–08 (2nd ed. 2013) (observing local officials have 
incentives to over utilize debt); Gelfand, supra note 94, at 549–51 (providing historical context around 
the need for debt limitations and indicating that future taxpayers are the primary beneficiaries of debt 
ceilings); Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness 
of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1301, 1322–24 (1991) (“[A]s courts dealt with 
legislative attempts to evade constitutional restrictions, judicial opinions, too, reflected the view that 
constitutional limitations were necessary to retrain legislative tendencies to incur too much debt.”). 
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future taxpayers.99  Long-term capital appreciation bonds—on which no 
debt service (including interest on compounded interest) is paid until at or 
near maturity—take this to an extreme.  In the case of the 2011 Poway 
Transaction, for example, taxpayers will pay nearly $1 billion between 2033 
and 2051 on $105 million of debt ($126 million of proceeds including 
principal and original issue premium) for upgrades and modernization of 
schools;100 it is not hard to imagine that the facilities will again need to be 
modernized even before the first debt service payment is made.  
Even if, as appears to be the case in some instances, school districts use 
CABs to try to maintain substantially level tax rates throughout the life of 
the debt, interperiod equity may be compromised.  First, even if their tax 
rates are not higher because assessed valuations rise over time as projected, 
future taxpayers may pay a disproportionate share of the facilities financed 
with the CABs, particularly if assessed valuations were projected to rise 
more rapidly than inflation101 or if already outstanding debt that matures 
in the near—to medium—term is also factored into the calculation.  
Second, future taxpayers bear the risk that property values will not increase 
as expected or (less likely) will decline.  Should this occur, they will have to 
pay higher tax rates for debt service, and the district’s ability to issue 
additional debt may be constrained as long as the CABs remain 
outstanding.102   
If total debt service on school district general obligation bonds were 
fully capitalized into real estate values—that is, if property values 
accurately reflected the cost of future debt service—CABs would not 
disproportionately burden future property owners.103  Scholars have 
reached varying conclusions about the extent to which taxes are capitalized 
 
99. An increase in debt service over time that reflects expected inflation would be appropriate; 
otherwise future taxpayers would be paying less in real dollars than current taxpayers are.  The 
concern is with structures in which a substantial portion of debt service is delayed. 
100. POWAY UNIFIED SCH. DIST., 2011 OFFICIAL STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 1–2, 5, 13–
14. 
101. This is more likely to occur in states that do not impose strict limits on assessed valuation 
increases. 
102. Requiring future taxpayers to bear the risk of assessed valuations growing more slowly 
than projected is particularly troubling because school district officials have incentives to make 
optimistic assumptions about future property value growth.  See infra Section IV.E. 
103. See Clayton P. Gillette, Direct Democracy and Debt, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 365, 392 
(2004) (noting greater capitalization results in more closely aligned interests of current and future 
taxpayers). 
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into home values, though it appears that some capitalization occurs.104  
However, even if property taxes are fully capitalized in some 
circumstances, it is unlikely that the possibility of higher future taxes—
because of a school district’s debt structure—would be.  Information 
about a school district’s general obligation debt level and debt service 
structure is not typically provided to prospective purchasers by realtors or 
title companies, making it unlikely that this information would be known 
to a buyer.105 
Furthermore, even if a buyer had this information, he or she would also 
need information about current assessed valuations in the school district 
and would need to either obtain and evaluate existing projections of 
assessed valuation growth and the assumptions on which they were 
based,106 or develop his or her own projections in order to predict the 
impact of debt service on future tax rates.  To obtain a complete picture, a 
prospective purchaser would have to gather and analyze information for 
every local government within the territory of which the property was 
located.107  The difficulties and uncertainties of determining the impact of 
CABs on future tax rates make it unlikely that they are fully capitalized.108   
 
104. See id. (noting some capitalization results in a limited ability to pass on tax increases to 
new buyers); see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOMES VALUES 
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE AND LAND USE POLICIES 47–
51 (2005) (discussing various capitalization studies and concluding that anticipated taxes are fully 
capitalized). 
105. While information about a school district’s debt service structure is available from 
documents posted on the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board’s (MSRB’s) Electronic Municipal 
Market Access website (emma.msrb.org), or by making a public records request to the district, it is 
not likely that many prospective purchasers do this. 
106. See DAYTON, supra note 42, at 75 (noting assessed valuation projections may not be 
available at all).  A new California law that requires school boards to obtain assessed valuation 
projections that take into consideration those of the county assessor, in advance of calling a bond 
election, (see infra note 308 and accompanying text) and the new requirements imposed by AB 182 
and HB 114, with respect to CABs, may help to some extent (particularly the provisions of HB 114). 
107. There could be several of these, including a county, a city, a community college district, 
and other special districts in addition to the school district. 
108. Even William Fischel, who argues in favor of capitalization, notes that capitalization is 
100% only for anticipated taxes.  FISCHEL, supra 104, at 49–51.  While Fischel was discussing 
anticipated changes in the law, the same concept would apply if potential purchasers could not 
determine the amount of the future taxes.  See also Darien Shanske, Public Tax Dollars for Private 
Suburban Development: A First Report on a National Phenomenon, 26 VA. TAX REV. 709, 751–58 (2007) 
(arguing Mello-Roos assessments are not fully capitalized).  Mello-Roos taxes, which are authorized 
under the Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982 (codified at California Government Code 
Sections 53311–53368.3), are more likely than a school district’s general obligation debt structure to 
be fully capitalized.  Notices of Mello-Roos assessments that include information about the rate and 
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B. CABs Cost More 
Yields often are higher on CABs—and zero-coupon bonds—than on 
current interest bonds, particularly in a low interest rate environment like 
that of recent years.  There are three reasons for this.  First, because CABs 
do not receive any payment on the bonds until at or near maturity, 
investors are more concerned about adverse changes in the condition of 
the issuer or changes in market conditions that would negatively affect the 
price at which the investor would be able to sell the CABs in the secondary 
market, and about the risk of default (though defaults of local government 
bonds, and particularly of general obligation bonds, are extremely rare).109  
Second, when interest rates are low, investors demand a higher rate 
because, in effect, the interest earned on CABs is automatically reinvested 
in the same bond (and cannot be invested in anything else).110  Since 
investors expect interest rates to go up in the period during which the 
bonds are outstanding, they charge a premium for the foregone investment 
opportunities.  Third, there generally are fewer buyers for CABs in the 
secondary market than there are for CIBs, which means that it may be 
harder to sell them.111  Based on a review of data for the last business day 
 
method of apportionment of the tax are filed with the county recorder as a special lien and hence 
could be found in a title search.  See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 53328.3 (Deering 2008) (stating the notice 
of lien must be filed with the county recorder); see also CAL. STS. & HIGH CODE §§ 3114.5, 3115.5 
(Deering 2008) (establishing the information required to be included in the filing and noting the lien 
will continue in full force and effect until the tax obligation has been paid and satisfied).  
Furthermore, because Mello-Roos taxes cannot be based on assessed values—and instead are based 
on features like lot size, whether or not the lot is developed, or the purpose of the lot—potential 
buyers typically have the information necessary to calculate their maximum tax rates based on the 
formula in the recorded notice.  But see FISCHEL, supra 104, at 49–50 (describing a 1994 study by A. 
Quang Do and C. F. Sirmans concluding that Mello-Roos taxes are fully capitalized).  Shanske argues 
against the study’s conclusion.  Shanske, supra, at 755–58. 
109. Only ninety-five issuers defaulted on bonds rated by Moody’s Investors Service  
(one of the three entities rating municipal bonds) between 1970 and 2014, and of these, only eight 
involved general obligation bonds (though four of these occurred in 2012 and 2013).  US Municipal 
Bond Defaults and Recoveries, 1970–2014, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., 10 (July 24, 2015), 
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBM_1006917 [https:// 
perma.cc/7CAJ-SRCH].  This compares to a total of 15,400 ratings at the end of 2014, 8,600 of 
which were ratings on general obligation bonds.  Id. at 6. 
110. MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., ABOUT ORIGINAL ISSUE DISCOUNT BONDS 3, 
http://www.msrb.org/msrb1/pdfs/Original-Issue-Discount-Bonds.pdf [https://perma.cc/L76F-
FM5G]. 
111. James Ramage, As Spread for Zeros Shrink, Debate on Their Value Grows, THE BOND BUYER 
(Mar. 8, 2013, 1:43 PM), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/122_47/muni-investors-see-yield-in-
zero-coupon-bonds-as-activity-picks-up-1049482-1.html [https://perma.cc/63LD-PU5E] (quoting 
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of March and September from 1996 to 2015, in the vast majority of cases, 
AAA-rated CABs had higher yields than comparable CIBs, and in the 
most extreme case, 1.18% higher yields.112   
In addition, the interest on CABs compounds over many years, which 
increases the overall cost, though not—absent the higher yields described 
in the preceding paragraph—the present value of the stream of debt 
service payments.  Issuers generally pay approximately $2 to $3 of debt 
service for every $1 of principal on CIBs.113  In contrast, issuers 
reportedly pay between $3.50 and $23 for every $1 of principal on 
CABs.114  The ratio of proceeds to debt service would be lower for bonds 
issued at a premium.  For the top one-hundred most expensive CABs 
outstanding in Texas as of August 31, 2016, districts paid between $2.85 to 
$10.87 of debt service for every $1 of proceeds, as compared to less than 
$2 for the typical CIB.115   
C. CABs Conceal the Full Amount of Debt 
As discussed in this section, interest that compounds on CABs is not 
counted against state constitutional and statutory debt limits even though, 
once it compounds, there is no substantive reason to distinguish the 
interest from the original principal.  Failing to count compounding interest 
for debt limit purposes is likely to be contrary to the expectations of 
voters, gives the impression to the public (and to school board members 
 
Matt Fabian of Municipal Market Advisors) (stating CABs (referred to as “zeros” in the article) lack 
broad investor demand). 
112. The Municipal Market Monitor (TM 3), NonCall and Zero Yield Curves as of 
09/30/2015 (2016) (on file with author).  There were some instances in which yields on AAA-rated 
CABs were the same or slightly lower than the rate on AAA-rated CIBs with the same term (up to 
0.06% and primarily for one, two, and three-year bonds).  Id.  The difference in interest rates for 
CABs and CIBs varies depending on the term of the bond and changes from day to day.  In the very 
high interest rate environment of the early 1980s, interest rates on CABs and zero-coupon bonds 
were lower than those on comparable CIBs.  See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
113. Cal. S. Governance & Fin. Comm., A.B. 182 School Bonds Bill Analysis (Revised) 
(July 11, 2013), 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal. 2013), available at http://leginfo. 
legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB182 [https://perma.cc/J8VK-
V2B4]; see Lovett, supra note 12 (reporting average school bonds usually cost two or three times what 
was initially borrowed in repayment); see also Weikel, supra note 12 (“Most school bonds . . . require 
roughly $2 to $3 to be paid back for every $1 borrowed.”). 
114. See Cal. S. Governance & Fin. Comm. A.B. 182 School Bonds (Revised) (July 11, 2013), 
2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal. 2013), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/ 
faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB182 [https://perma.cc/XYX4-98N2] (indicating 
the debt to principal rations for CABs varies widely). 
115. TBRB, 2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 106–08. 
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and officials) that less debt is being incurred than actually is, and, in effect, 
allows issuers to circumvent these limits.  This is particularly concerning in 
situations—such as that of California and Texas school district general 
obligation bonds—where voter approval of debt is required.116 
Compounding interest on CABs is not counted against limits on the 
amount of debt that can be issued or outstanding, such as the amounts 
authorized by voters in Texas and California and the limit on debt as a 
percentage of assessed valuation in California.117  This exclusion is such a 
fundamental component of the CAB that it is included in the definition of 
“Capital Appreciation Bonds” published by the MSRB—a self-regulatory 
organization created under federal securities laws to regulate the municipal 
bond market—which states that: 
[B]ecause the investment return is considered to be in the form of 
compounded interest rather than accreted original issue discount [as it would 
be for a zero-coupon bond] . . . only the initial principal amount of a CAB 
would be counted against a municipal issuer’s statutory debt limit.118   
In Texas, ballot propositions and election orders are required to include 
the “principal amount” of the bonds,119 and premium—used to pay costs 
of the project for which the bonds were issued—is also counted against 
the voter-authorized amount.120  In California the “amount” of the bonds 
that must be included on the ballot is interpreted to mean the principal 
amount.121   
However, there is a strong argument that once interest has been added 
to the original principal amount of the CABs, it should be treated as debt 
and counted against debt limits.122  Clearly, from a commercial 
 
116. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3(e); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. 
§ 45.003(a) (West 2012). 
117. See supra Section II.B. for discussion of these limits. 
118. Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Capital Appreciation Bond, MUN. SEC.  
RULEMAKING BD., http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/CAPITAL-APPRECIATION-
BOND-_CAB_.aspx [https://perma.cc/KL84-R3F6].  In contrast, the full amount payable at 
maturity is counted for zero coupon bonds.  Id. 
119. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 3.009(b)(3), 52.072(e)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2016). 
120. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 1201.042(e) (West Supp. 2016). 
121. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15122 (Deering 2013).  In California, original issue premium cannot 
be used to pay project costs.  CAL. EDUC. § 15146 (Deering 2016). 
122. In Texas, where premium—used to pay costs of the project for which the bonds were 
issued—is already counted against the debt limit (as described in Texas Government Code Section 
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perspective, compound interest is treated as new debt as it accrues, in turn 
attracting its own interest;123 and, not surprisingly, under accrual basis 
accounting—which recognizes receipts and obligations when they are 
incurred—the interest on CABs is treated as a liability as it compounds.124  
Most companies and government utilities in the U.S. use accrual 
accounting.125  Financial statements filed with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) are presumed to be misleading or inaccurate 
if they are not prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles,126 which require accrual accounting because it provides “a 
better basis for assessing the entity’s past and future performance than 
information solely about cash receipts and payments . . . .”127  Under the 
Internal Revenue Code, taxable income of large corporations is generally 
required to be determined on an accrual basis.128  Under standards 
promulgated by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), 
government-wide financial statements—which show information about 
 
1201.042(e)); interest should be included only to the extent doing so does not result in double-
counting. 
123. See DAVID C. GARLOCK, ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF DEBT 
INSTRUMENTS 20 (6th ed. 2014) (“In effect, the lender is making one or more additional loans to the 
borrower by letting the accrued interest remain unpaid, and so charges interest on these additional 
loans.”). 
124. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
CONCEPTS NO. 8, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING ¶ OB17 (2010) 
[hereinafter FASB STATEMENT NO. 8] (describing accrual accounting as showing the effects of 
transactions on the economic condition of the entity at the time the effects occur, notwithstanding 
the timing of cash payments). 
125. See GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 34, BASIC 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS—AND MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS—FOR STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, at Preface (1999) [hereinafter GASB STATEMENT NO. 34] (explaining 
“[m]ost governmental utilities and private-sector companies” utilize accrual accounting, which 
reports all revenues and costs for current and long-term assets). 
126. SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(1) (2016). 
127. FASB STATEMENT NO. 8, supra note 124, ¶ OB17; see also FIN. ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 6, ELEMENTS OF 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ¶ 134 (1985) (describing accrual accounting and related concepts, and 
explaining that accrual accounting provides information that cannot be obtained by cash basis 
accounting); D. EDWARD MARTIN, ATTORNEY’S HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING AND 
FINANCIAL REPORTING §§ 2.04(3), 3.02(5) (4th ed. 2015) (stating the accrual basis of accounting 
“has been developed to provide the most accurate picture of an entity’s operations”). 
128. 26 I.R.C. §§ 446, 448 (2016); see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE, PUBLICATION 538: ACCOUNTING PERIODS AND METHODS 9–10 (Dec. 2012), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p538--2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CYJ-XG48]. 
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the governmental entity as a whole—are prepared on an accrual basis.129  
Further, treating the interest on capital appreciation bonds differently from 
the original issue discount on zero coupon bonds—even though they are 
functionally the same—values form over substance.  
The California Debt and Investment Advisory Board (CDIAC) has 
indicated that California local governments should include the full accreted 
value of CABs as “debt outstanding” in annual debt transparency 
reports,130 suggesting they view compounded interest as debt.  
The Texas Bond Review Board (TBRB) noted, in its local government 
annual reports for 2011, 2012, and 2013, that debt was understated 
because CABs were reported at their initial principal amount rather than 
their maturity value. 131  This statement was dropped from the reports 
beginning in 2014, presumably because data on maturity values of CABs 
also were included in those reports.132  The disclaimer for the Texas 
 
129. GASB STATEMENT NO. 34, supra note 125, ¶¶ 6(b)(1), 12(e), 16.  Under GASB 
standards, local governments also prepare fund financial statements, which have a shorter-term focus 
and are intended to demonstrate compliance with budgets and legal and contractual requirements.  Id. 
¶ 6(b); see also GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., WHITE PAPER: WHY 
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING IS – AND SHOULD BE – 
DIFFERENT 7 (2013) (noting fund accounting focuses on control and accountability over public 
money and on whether there are sufficient resources in the short-term).  GASB requires the use of a 
“modified accruals basis” in the fund financial statements for funds used to account for activities that 
are governmental in nature (like those related to general obligation bonds).  Id. ¶ 79.  Thus, interest 
on CABs is not reflected until it is due in this portion of the financial statements.  See id. at Preface 
(using the example of taxes collected at the time they are needed to pay debt service as an example of 
the short-term focus of fund financial statements); see also CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCH. FISCAL 
SERVS. DIV., CALIFORNIA SCHOOL ACCOUNTING MANUAL 101-3 (2016), http://www.cde. 
ca.gov/fg/ac/sa/documents/csam2016complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/F387-YNLY] (indicating 
un-matured interest on long-term debt is recorded when it is due under the modified accrual basis). 
130. CAL. DEBT AND INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, GUIDANCE ON COMPLYING  
WITH SB 1029, at 4 (Dec. 4, 2016), http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/sb1029/guidance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BH87-ADFC]. 
131. TEX. BOND REVIEW BD., LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 10 (2012), 
http://www.brb.state.tx.us/pub/lgs/fy2011/2011LocalARFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZJG-7PT9]; 
TEX. BOND REVIEW BD., LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 10 (2013), 
http://www.brb.state.tx.us/pub/lgs/fy2012/2012LocalARFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/GEQ3-
RLDK]; TEX. BOND REVIEW BD., LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 10 (2014) 
[hereinafter TBRB, 2013 REPORT], http://www.brb.state.tx.us/pub/lgs/fy2013/2013LocalARFinal. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/VW3C-YUR5]. 
132. TEX. BOND REVIEW BD., LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 10–11 
(2015), http://www.brb.state.tx.us/pub/lgs/fy2014/2014LocalARFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
FNT2-T39C]; TEX. BOND REVIEW BD., LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 11–12 
(2015) [hereinafter TBRB, 2015 REPORT], http://www.brb.state.tx.us/pub/lgs/fy2015/ 
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Comptroller’s “Texas Transparency” website—which provides 
information about state and local government finances—indicates that 
compounded interest on CABs is not included in the debt figures provided 
on the site,133 which suggests that readers, absent the disclaimer, might 
otherwise assume they were. 
IV.    REASONS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ISSUE CABS 
General obligation bonds are especially likely to be issued as CABs.  
Virtually all CABs issuances in California and Texas in 2015 were general 
obligation bonds.134  There are several possible reasons for this.  In many 
cases, fees and charges can be raised without voter approval or with the 
approval of a lower percentage of voters than would be required to issue 
general obligation bonds.135  Perhaps the political cost of raising property 
taxes is higher than those of raising fees or charges, or possibly even other 
types of taxes (such as sales taxes) that support revenue bonds.  Fees, 
charges, and other types of taxes generally are not subject to restrictions 
comparable to the expected rate limits; this may be another factor making 
it less likely that revenue bonds will be issued as CABs.136  Further, 
because general obligation bonds are payable from property taxes assessed 
specifically for that purpose, and not from other funds of the issuer, there 
is a disconnect between the funding of the issuer’s mission and the 
payment source for the bonds.  That is, because payment of debt service 
does not directly affect a school district’s ability to educate students, 
officials may be less focused than they otherwise would be on the structure 
 
2015LocalARFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WPP-ANJL]; TBRB, 2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 11–
12. 
133. Transparency, COMPTROLLER.TEXAS.GOV, https://www.comptroller.texas.gov/ 
transparency/local/debt/counties.php [https://perma.cc/3CBU-JXQL]. 
134. This assessment is based on data from the CDIAC and the TBRB.  California 2015 
Issuances, supra note 9; TBRB Issuances FY 2007–2015, supra note 9. 
135. In California, some charges and fees do not require voter approval.  MAC TAYLOR, CAL. 
LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFFICE, A LOOK AT VOTER-APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LOCAL TAXES 3–
5 (2014), http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2014/finance/local-taxes/voter-approval-032014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VQP9-SD68].  Others require approval by a majority of voters.  Id.  Taxes, other 
than property taxes, require approval by either a majority or a two-thirds supermajority of voters, 
depending on the nature of the tax.  Id. 
136. While revenue bond indentures often prohibit the issuance of additional debt, unless the 
ratio of projected annual revenues to debt service is at a specified level, these negotiated ratios may 
be less likely to impose a real constraint on an issuer’s ability to issue debt.  In part, this is because in 
many cases, additional expected revenues from the facilities being financed can be included in the 
calculation.   
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and impact of those payments.  In contrast, fees, charges, and other taxes 
often can be used to pay both operating and capital costs.  In Texas, the 
requirement that the principal amount of general obligation refunding 
bonds must not exceed the principal amount of the refinanced bonds also 
encourages the issuance of general obligation bonds in the form of 
premium CABs.137   
The following sections discuss several reasons why California and Texas 
school districts issue general obligation bonds in the form of CABs.  More 
than one reason may contribute to an issuance.   
A. In Some Instances, CABs Can Result in Lower Overall Debt Service 
In some cases, school districts use capital appreciation bonds because 
doing so either alone or as part of a transaction that also includes current 
interest bonds, results in lower overall debt service. 
While this generally is not the case today, in high interest rate 
environments—such as in the 1980s—the yield on CABs is lower than on 
CIBs because “[t]he investor accepts a somewhat lower rate of return to 
lock up a relatively high rate of interest for an extended period of years.  
Moreover, the investor has no worries about reinvesting coupon income, 
possibly at disadvantageous rates.”138  
In some market conditions, using capital appreciation bonds in 
conjunction with current interest bonds allows issuers to achieve lower 
overall debt service (without violating expected rate limits, or while 
maintaining level tax rates or keeping tax rates below levels promised to 
voters).139  In circumstances where short-term interest rates are lower 
than long-term interest rates, issuing long-term CABs may allow the rest of 
 
137. See infra Section IV.F. (explaining Texas’s requirements for refunding bonds). 
138. See Metz, supra note 89 (demonstrating the bond maturity values for long term bonds); see 
also Petersen, supra note 83, at 20 (“Long-term original discount bonds attract investors whose 
objective is the accumulation of future wealth and who anticipate that their future reinvestment rates 
may be lower than present coupon rates.”); see also Scott H. Williamson, Tax-Exempt Zero Coupon Bond 
Pricing, 35 NAT’L TAX J. 497, 497 (1982) (“In order for rational investors to be willing to purchase 
ZCBs at lower yields than those on equivalent CCBs, there must be some features of ZCBs which are 
attractive.  Often mentioned is the absence of coupon reinvestment rate risk.  This usually implies the 
possibility that rates may fall.”); Michael Quint, Credit Markets: Rates Show Little Change, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 3, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/03/business/credit-markets-rates-show-little-
change.html [https://perma.cc/N9RF-JHZ2] (noting the issuer will “automatically reinvest the 
interest payments at the stated rate”). 
139. See infra Section IV.B. for a discussion of the use of CABs to avoid violating expected 
rate limits and Section 0 for discussion of the use of CABs to avoid near-term tax rate increases. 
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the bonds to be issued as shorter-term CIBs (rather than the alternative of 
issuing only longer-term CIBs) to take advantage of lower interest rates on 
shorter-term debt.140  More than 80% of the issuances of general 
obligation CABs by California school districts in 2015 were part of a 
transaction that also included CIBs.141  However, absent concerns about 
keeping tax rates below a specified level, similar or even lower overall debt 
service often could be achieved by issuing only shorter-term current 
interest bonds—or even a combination of shorter-term and longer-term 
current interest bonds (but no capital appreciation bonds)—because 
interest would not be compounding and because, in most circumstances, 
rates on CABs are higher than on CIBs.142  
B. CABs Allow Districts to Provide Facilities While Avoiding Near-Term Tax 
Increases 
School districts and other issuers structure debt with payments 
concentrated at the end of the repayment schedule—long-term CABs are 
an extreme example—to provide facilities without increasing taxes for 
current property owners.  Because taxes generally are not levied to pay 
principal and interest on general obligation bonds until near the time such 
debt service must be paid,143 interest that compounds over the life of a 
CAB is not reflected in tax rates until near maturity.  
This use of CABs can be motivated by the political benefits of 
providing new facilities to current taxpayers without requiring them to pay 
the cost of the facilities, the desire to keep promises to voters about tax 
rates, or the inclination to maintain substantially level tax rates.  Because 
these reasons all are ultimately efforts to avoid tax rate increases, albeit 
viewed from different perspectives, all three are addressed under this 
heading. 
 
140. See CDIAC Webinar – Bond Math II Transcript (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.treasurer. 
ca.gov/cdiac/webinars/2011/20111007/transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WYD-YG67] (explaining 
it is possible to structure the amount of bond allocated between CABs and CIBs in a way that lowers 
the overall cost for the entire bond issue). 
141. This percentage calculation is drawn from data provided by the CDIAC.  California 
Issuances 2015, supra note 9; See also CDIAC Webinar – Bond Math II Transcript, supra note 140 (noting 
usually CABs are issued with CIBs); L.A. CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 86, at 103, 
111–12 (indicating that of the twelve CABs evaluated, only one was not issued in combination with 
CIBs). 
142. See supra Section III.B. for discussion of interest rates on CABs. 
143. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15250 (Deering 2013); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 26.04 
(West Supp. 2017). 
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Providing Facilities to Today’s Taxpayers at the Expense of 
Tomorrow’s.  There is a significant incentive for locally elected officials to 
use debt to provide immediate benefits to constituents while ignoring 
potentially negative long-term issues that may eventually surface.144  Even 
if current constituents are concerned about the future burden, that 
concern will be merely one factor of many that contributes to their 
decision on whether to re-elect local officials.145  
Elected officials may be reluctant to propose bond measures that 
increase tax rates because of the political ramifications of doing so.  This 
may be one reason that “they postpone maturity dates [on] the principal 
for a long period of time.”146  Issuing CABs, and, thus, postponing 
interest payments, simply takes this one step further.  Moody’s Investors 
Service has indicated that one reason school districts use CABs is to 
respond to taxpayer requests “to build new schools and maintain low 
student-to-teacher ratios” without significantly increasing taxes.147   
The voters, school board members, and district officials who authorize 
and issue bonds today, and whose children benefit from the facilities 
financed with the proceeds of those bonds, likely will not pay the debt 
service on CABs that do not mature for many years.  As stated by the 
then-treasurer of California, “The average tenure of a school 
superintendent is about three and a half years, so they aren’t going to be 
around in most instances to worry about paying that off. . . .   Nor will the 
voters, probably, that enacted it in the first place.”148 
It appears that concern about keeping property tax rates low (at least in 
the near term) was one reason that, in 2009, the California legislature 
eliminated a requirement that general obligation new money bonds, issued 
by California local governments under the state’s Government Code, have 
 
144. AMDURSKY, supra note 98, at 207–08 (“[L]ocal officials, who will want to demonstrate 
constructive activity to constituents before the next election, have incentives to overutilize debt, 
paying scant attention to long-term adverse effects.”). 
145. Id. at 208. 
146. JACKSON L. FLANIGAN ET AL., MANAGING SCHOOL INDEBTEDNESS: A COMPLETE 
GUIDE TO SCHOOL BONDING 83–84 (2d ed. 1995). 
147. Yvette Shields, Illinois School Districts’ Use of CABs Not all Negative, Moody’s Reports, THE 
BOND BUYER (Apr. 17, 2007), http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/-268763-1.html [https://perma. 
cc/N4RP-T442]. 
148. Shane Shifflett, Sharon Pieczenik, & Trey Bundy, Controversial School Bonds Create ‘Debt for 
the Next Generation’, REVEAL (Jan. 31, 2013), https://www.revealnews.org/article/controversial-
school-bonds-create-debt-for-the-next-generation [https://perma.cc/896D-QEXN] (quoting Bill 
Lockyer, former treasurer of California). 
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substantially level debt service,149 which had the effect of making it easier 
for school districts to issue longer term CABs.  The California Governor’s 
Office of Planning and Research indicated that the amendments would 
allow issuers to “use increasing property values to keep property taxes at 
their lowest possible rate through final maturity of the bonds.”150  Put 
another way, district officials would be able to defer debt service until a 
time further in the future when they projected that assessed valuations 
would be higher and the same property tax rate would generate more 
revenues than today.151   
Keeping Promises to Voters.  School district officials use CABs to 
keep promises to voters about both tax rates and capital projects.  When 
voters are asked to approve a school district bond measure in California, 
the bond measure must include the purposes for which the bonds are to 
be used.152  Texas law similarly requires that the document ordering the 
election and the ballot proposition describe the purposes of the bonds.153  
California law also requires that voters be provided the “best estimate” of 
the tax rate for the bonds in the first year after bonds are expected to be 
issued, the year after the last bonds are expected to be issued, and the year 
in which the rate is estimated to be highest.154  While there is not a 
comparable requirement in Texas (where either the estimated tax rate or 
the maximum interest rate—but not both—must be included in the 
 
149. See Assemb. B. 1388, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (changing the law to 
eliminate the requirement that bonds “be structured to amortize so that the maximum annual debt 
service payment . . . does not exceed the minimum annual debt service payment by more than 10%”). 
150. CAL. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, A.B. 1388 ENROLLED BILL 
REPORT 4 (2009). 
151. See infra Section IV.E. for discussion of assumptions about future assessed valuation 
growth. 
152. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(b)(3)(B) (mandating the proposition presented to the 
voters include “[a] list of the specific school facilities projects to be funded”); see also CAL. EDUC. 
CODE § 15122 (Deering 2013) (requiring “the purposes for which the proceeds of the sale of bonds 
are to be used” to be printed on the ballot box in a bonds election); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 53410(a), 
(b) (Deering 2011) (mandating any local bond measure subject to voter approval include a statement 
“indicating the specific purposes of the bond”). 
153. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 3.009(b)(2), 52.072(e)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2016). 
154. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9401(a) (Deering 2016), amended by Assemb. B. No. 1194, 2017–2018 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).  The 2017 amendment to the California Election Code will require the 
statement to include the “best estimate of the average annual tax rate required to fund the proposed 
bond measure for the duration of its debt service” and to “identify the final fiscal year in which the 
tax is anticipated to be collected[,]” instead of providing the tax rate for the first year after the first 
bonds are expected to be issued and the first year after the last bonds are expected to be issued.  
Assemb. B. No. 1194, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
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election order),155 districts do, at least in some cases, make information 
about the expected tax rate impact of the bonds available on their web 
sites.156  In some instances (probably often), districts do not indicate that 
actual tax rates for debt service may be higher than expected.  
Even where not legally required, districts make promises and provide 
information to voters about expected tax rates and planned capital 
projects.  School districts opted to include language promising no increase 
in taxes on approximately 15% (13 out of 88) of the school district bond 
measures on local ballots in California in 2010.157  Furthermore, as was 
noted in the prior paragraph, some school districts present the projected 
tax impact of bond measures on their web sites and in information 
provided to the community.158  Some districts also provide information 
(with varying degrees of detail) on their web sites about the projects to be 
financed.159   
 
155. TEX. ELEC. § 3.009(b)(5) (West Supp. 2016). 
156. See Alvin ISD Trustees Call for November Bond Election, ALVIN INDEP. SCH.  
DIST., http://www.alvinisd.net/site/default.aspx?PageType=3&ModuleInstanceID=29749&ViewID 
=7b97f7ed-8e5e-4120-848f-a8b4987d588f&RenderLoc=0&FlexDataID=27512&PageID=23385 
[https://perma.cc/UCY4-GAR4] (noting tax rates would increase by a maximum of $.083 per $100 
of assessed valuation if a $245 million bond issue were passed by voters in November 2015); see  
also YISD Estimated Property Calculator, YSLETA INDEP. SCH. DIST., https://bisweb.yisd.net/ 
YISDPropertyTaxCalculator/YISDPropertyTaxCalculator.aspx [https://perma.cc/C5DJ-44V9] 
(allowing anyone who visits the website to calculate the effect of the November 2015 bond measure 
on property taxes). 
157. This percentage is calculated based on data provided by the Institute for Social Research 
Center for California Studies at California State University, Sacramento.  INST. FOR SOC.  
RESEARCH CTR. FOR CAL. STUDIES CAL. STATE UNIV. SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA COUNTY, CITY 
AND SCHOOL DISTRICT ELECTION OUTCOMES, 2010 ELECTIONS, 17–30 (2010), 
http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/county-city-school-district-election-results/2010/school-district-
report-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/R48H-6MHZ].  Notably, there were significantly fewer measures 
containing such language in 2012 (8 out of 136) and in 2014 (6 out of 163).  INST. FOR SOC. 
RESEARCH, 2012 ELECTIONS, supra note 49, at 19–38; INST. FOR SOC. RESEARCH, 2014 ELECTIONS, 
supra note 49, at 19–39. 
158. See Alvin ISD Trustees Call for November Bond Election, supra note 156; see also YISD Estimated 
Property Calculator, supra note 156 (providing a way to calculate the effect of the November 2015 bond 
measure on property taxes); Measure S, HERMOSA BEACH CITY SCH. DIST., 
http://hbcsd.org/District/23252-Untitled.html [https://perma.cc/GYP2-XBX5] (indicating the tax 
rate for a 2016 bond measure would be $29.50 per $100,000 of assessed value). 
159. See Alvin ISD Trustees Call for November Bond Election, supra note 156 (describing projects to 
be financed with bond proceeds); see also Bond Site Maps, HERMOSA BEACH CITY SCH. DIST., 
http://hbcsd.org/District/23249-Untitled.html [https://perma.cc/8EQJ-TG88] (providing site 
maps for Hermosa Beach City School District and descriptions of projects at each site); Bond Projects 
by Campus, YSLETA INDEP. SCH. DIST., https://www.yisd.net/domain/2563 [https://perma.cc/ 
A5A3-LXPK] (identifying bond-funded school district projects by campus). 
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While property taxes must be raised if necessary to pay debt service on 
any bonds that are issued—and districts are not legally obligated to 
complete all the projects described—at least some district officials appear 
to view these types of statements as commitments that they endeavor to 
keep.  For example, the official statement for CABs issued by the San 
Diego Unified School District in 2012 to refinance outstanding debt 
stated:  
Due to lower assessed valuations of taxable property within the District than 
were projected at the time of issuance of the outstanding bonds, the District 
currently projects that the tax rate necessary to pay outstanding bonds . . . 
will exceed the tax rate [identified in the materials for the bond measure 
passed by the voters] unless actions are taken to restructure the outstanding 
bonds.  The District is undertaking the plan of restructuring described below 
in order to reduce debt service in fiscal years 2011–12 and 2012–13 and 
establish a tax rate reserve, which will allow the District to continue to 
implement its capital improvement program through the issuance of 
additional authorized general obligation bonds within the tax rate 
identified . . . .160 
The desire to keep tax rates at or below promised levels appears to be one 
of the primary reasons for the controversial Poway Transaction.161  Napa 
Valley Unified School District also reportedly issued CABs for this 
reason.162   
District officials may feel greater pressure to keep promises to voters by 
issuing CABs when assessed values for real property have declined—or 
have not increased—as anticipated at the time a bond measure was passed.  
This situation is more likely to arise when districts base tax rate estimates 
 
160. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST., $65,434,441.70 SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL 
DISTRICT 2012 GENERAL OBLIGATION REFUNDING BONDS (DEDICATED UNLIMITED AD 
VALOREM PROPERTY TAX BONDS) SERIES R-1, $56,869,830 SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL 
DISTRICT 2012 OBLIGATION REFUNDING BONDS (DEDICATED UNLIMITED AD VALOREM 
PROPERTY TAX BONDS) SERIES R-2, http://emma.msrb.org/EP611468-EP478356-EP878739.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K99D-RQDN]. 
161. ESI INT’L, INC., POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT BUILDING FOR SUCCESS 
PROGRAM FINANCING BOND TRANSACTION PROPOSITION C, SERIES B REPORT OF 
INVESTIGATION 12–14, 16, 19 (2013), http://voiceofsandiego.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ 
51002d5d73afa.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK8S-4MQ5]. 
162. Shifflett, Pieczenik, & Bundy, supra note 148; see infra note 314 (noting Napa Valley 
Unified School District has since refinanced some of its CABs). 
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and planned projects on optimistic assumptions about assessed valuation 
growth.163  
Maintaining Substantially Level Tax Rates.  Property owners “find 
it easier to live with a more or less stable tax rate.”164  Significant changes 
in property tax rates from year to year would make planning difficult, and 
likely would result in angry and frustrated taxpayers and possibly higher 
delinquency rates.  Thus, school districts typically endeavor to impose a 
relatively level tax burden over time.165   
The use of CABs assists school districts in maintaining substantially 
level tax rates in two ways.  First, in situations where school districts have 
outstanding general obligation bonds that have relatively high debt service 
payments in the near term, a district may issue CABs with maturity dates 
after all or most of the existing bonds have matured so that debt service 
payments on the new bonds (and hence collection of the related property 
taxes) begin after debt service on existing ones has declined significantly or 
ended.  Second, school districts may assume that assessed valuations will 
have risen by the time that debt service payments need to be made years in 
the future, meaning that more revenues will be generated at the same tax 
rate.166  
C. School Districts Use CABs to Continue to Issue Debt Without Violating Limits 
on Expected Tax Rates 
Both California and Texas law impose expected rate limits, which 
prohibit school districts from issuing general obligation new money bonds 
if the expected tax rate to pay debt service on all the district’s general 
obligation debt (in Texas), or on all the general obligation bonds approved 
under the California 55% Regime at a specific election (in California) 
 
163. See infra Section IV.E. (discussing the assumptions about future assessed valuation 
growth). 
164. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 94, at 693. 
165. Seth Rosenblatt, Proposed Restrictions on School Bonds Would Harm Districts, EDSOURCE 
(Mar. 24, 2013), http://edsource.org/today/2013/proposed-restrictions-on-school-bonds-would-
harm-districts/29136#.UpeIaKX7W8Q [https://perma.cc/H6HT-AZYN]; see also Diana Lambert & 
Phillip Reese, Each $1 from Bonds to Cost Schools $18, SACRAMENTO BEE (Oct. 17, 2012, 7:06 AM), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20130515133055/http://www.sacbee.com/2012/10/17/4917486/eac
h-1-from-bonds-to-cost-schools.html [https://perma.cc/3U8N-XFAX] (indicating the Folsom 
Cordova Unified School District Superintendent stated that the district had structured its bonds so 
that taxpayers would pay a similar amount in taxes for twenty-five years). 
166. See infra Section IV.E. for discussion of assessed valuations and related assumptions. 
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exceeds a statutory limit.167  These restrictions are a major reason 
California and Texas school districts issue CABs.  As Fitch Ratings—one 
of the three entities providing credit ratings on municipal bonds—noted, 
“[B]y delaying repayment, CABs provide a financing vehicle when tax rate 
or debt level restrictions would prevent issuance of current interest 
bonds.”168  Fitch Ratings also indicated that tax rate limits or promised 
tax rates—combined with growing enrollments and stagnant or declining 
assessed valuations—or both, were among the primary reasons for 
increased CABs issuances in California and Texas.169  In a white paper 
generally critical of longer-term CABs, the Los Angeles County Treasurer 
and Tax Collector conceded that districts might need to use them to avoid 
violating the expected rate limit.170   
When debt service on a school district’s outstanding general obligation 
bonds—or, in California, general obligation bonds approved under the 
California 55% Regime at a particular election—is already at the expected 
rate limit, the district cannot legally issue current interest bonds because 
even a small amount of debt service before some of the outstanding bonds 
are repaid would cause the district to exceed the limit in any year.  
However, a district can issue CABs that mature after some or all the 
existing debt matures and annual debt service declines. 
School districts that cannot issue CIBs without violating the applicable 
expected rate limit have the option of issuing lease revenue bonds or 
certificates of participation (COPs), or not issuing debt at all; some do 
exercise these options.171  Lease revenue bonds and COPs are paid from 
 
167. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 15268, 15270(a) (Deering 2013); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. 
§ 45.0031(a) (West 2012); see also supra Section II.B., “Limits on Expected Tax Rates” (discussing the 
expected rate limits in Texas and California). 
168. Fitch Ratings Press Release, supra note 9. 
169. Id.; see also Aman Batheja, Swelling School Districts Find a Costly Way to Grow Within State Debt 
Limits, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 29, 2014, 6:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2014/08/29/fast-
growing-school-districts-use-controversial-fi/ [https://perma.cc/JH79-5V2P] (“[I]n recent years, 
critics have raised concerns as some fast-growing school districts have used the bonds to sidestep the 
50-cent test and sharply increase their overall debt.”). 
170. Letter from Mark Saladino, Treasurer & Tax Collector, Cty. of L.A., to Sch. Fin. Prof’ls  
2 (May 16, 2011), https://ttc.lacounty.gov/Proptax/docs/White%20Paper%20-%20School%20GO 
%20Bonds.pdf [https://perma.cc/UXK9-M384]. 
171. The percentage of school district and community college district general obligation debt 
that had been authorized by voters, but had not been issued, grew dramatically during the economic 
downturn in California.  CDIAC, VOTER APPROVED GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS: 
AUTHORIZED BUT UNISSUED, supra note 46, at 2. 
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district general funds (primarily state aid),172 and are used as a means to 
avoid voter authorization requirements and other restrictions that apply to 
general obligation bonds.173  However, districts prefer to issue general 
obligation bonds rather than these alternatives for two reasons.  First, 
unlike property taxes, other revenues generally cannot be increased to 
accommodate the debt service, and school districts prefer to use this finite 
resource to operate the district and educate students.  In fact, districts 
sometimes obtain voter authorization to refinance lease revenue bonds 
and COPs with general obligation bonds.  For example, Mojave Unified 
School District issued voter-approved bonds to repay COPs in 2015.174  
Second, interest rates on lease revenue bonds and COPs are typically 
higher because they are riskier to investors, generally have lower credit 
ratings than general obligation bonds,175 and, in Texas, because the Texas 
Permanent School Fund cannot guarantee these obligations.176  
School districts in California (unlike those in Texas) also can obtain 
another voter approval and issue bonds that otherwise cause debt service 
 
172. See CAL. DEBT ADVISORY COMM’N, CDAC NO. 93-8, GUIDELINES FOR LEASES AND 
CERTIFICATES OF PARTICIPATION 50 (1993) [hereinafter CDAC GUIDELINES] (discussing the 
difficulties school districts have generating funds locally and noting that school districts receive the 
bulk of funding from the state); Shama Gamkhar & Jerome Olson, Factors Affecting School District 
Choice of Bonds, NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROC. OF ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N, Fall 2002, at 396, 405 (stating 
Texas school district lease revenue “bonds can be repaid only with state aid (not taxes)”).  To use 
lease revenue bonds or certificates of participation, which are functionally the same, the third party 
acquires property or the school district leases property to a third party and the third party subleases 
the property back to the district at a rental rate that is sufficient to make payments on the lease 
revenue bonds or COPs issued by the third party.  CDIAC PRIMER, supra note 30, at 126, 185–86. 
173. CDAC GUIDELINES, supra note 172, at 50; Craig L. Johnson & John Mikesell, Certificates 
of Participation and Capital Markets: Lessons from Brevard County and Richmond Unified School District, PUB. 
BUDGETING & FIN., Fall 1994, at 41, 42, 52; see also Gamkhar & Olson, supra note 172, at 405 
(finding districts that are less likely to win a bond election are more likely to issue lease revenue 
bonds). 
174. MOJAVE ISD 2015 OFFICIAL STATEMENT, supra note 76, at Cover, 2, 7. 
175. CDAC GUIDELINES, supra note 172, at  16; Shama Gamkhar & Mona Koerner, Capital 
Financing of Schools: A Comparison of Lease Purchase Revenue Bonds and General Obligation Bonds, PUB. 
BUDGETING & FIN., Summer 2002, at 21, 24, 30–32; see Gamkhar & Olson, supra note 172, at  397; 
see also Beverly S. Bunch & Tina Smith, The Viability of Lease Purchases as a Means for Funding School 
Facilities, 27 J. OF EDUC. FIN. 1049, 1058–60 (2002).  Bunch and Smith also found that issuance costs 
were higher, but noted that the savings from avoiding a bond election would partially offset these 
costs.  Id. at 1058–59. 
176. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE Ann. §§ 33.65(b)(4), (7), (10), (12), (d)(1) (2017). 
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to exceed the expected rate limit,177 though they may be reluctant to or 
may not be able to do so in time to meet their funding needs. 
When school districts perceive a need to issue bonds quickly, they may 
issue CABs if they would otherwise be legally prevented from issuing 
general obligation bonds at all.  As was noted in Section IV.B., school 
district officials place importance on completing the capital projects that 
they have told voters they will undertake.  If a project is already under way, 
and additional funds are needed to complete it, the pressure is likely even 
more intense.  Further, many districts have pressing infrastructure needs 
that must be met to serve students in a safe, comfortable environment.  
For example, repairing or replacing leaking roofs was listed in dozens of 
California school district bond measures in 2014 as a use of bond 
proceeds.178  When California districts have issued bond anticipation 
notes (short-term interim debt) that are maturing, they have to either issue 
general obligation bonds to repay them (even if they must do so in the 
form of CABs) or repay them from the general fund (something they may 
not be able to do without compromising the education provided to 
students, if at all.)179  Districts also issue CABs to take advantage of state 
and federal assistance programs that are of limited duration or to take 
advantage of market conditions, such as low interest rates or low 
construction costs.180  For example, the Santa Ana Unified School 
District in California indicated it used CABs to take advantage of low 
construction costs, low interest rates, and state matching funds to issue 
federally subsidized Qualified School Construction Bonds (QSCBs) and 
Build America Bonds (BABs), and to build needed school facilities.181  
 
177. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3(e); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 45.0031 (West Supp. 2016); 
CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 15268, 15270(a) (Deering 2016). 
178. INST. FOR SOC. RESEARCH, 2014 ELECTIONS, supra note 49, at 19–39.   
179. One California financial advisor referred to bond anticipation notes as a “financial 
weapon of mass destruction” in a discussion of the untenable situation they can create for school 
districts.  SCOTT, supra note 49, at 172–73 (discussing the dangers of BANs to school districts). 
180. See ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83, at 7–8 (noting the use 
of CABs allows school districts to take advantage of state matching funds and federal subsidies). 
181. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Capital Appreciation Bonds Related to Measure G,  
SANTA ANA UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 1–2, http://www.sausd.us/cms/lib5/CA01000471/ 
Centricity/Domain/113/FAQ%20on%20Capital%20Appreciation%20Bonds.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
77LD-3A33].  While this district’s objective was to keep tax rates near the levels promised to voters 
rather than within the expected rate limits, it provides an example of many of the incentives for 
districts to issue CABs.  QSCBs and BABs were both programs of limited duration (QSCBs had to 
be issued within six months after receiving an allocation in California and the BABs program expired 
in 2010) that provided a direct federal subsidy to districts that issued taxable bonds.  TBRB, 2015 
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Poway Unified School District engaged in the interim funding transactions 
that it ultimately refinanced in the controversial Poway Transaction to 
access state matching funds, avoid cost increases, and complete projects as 
quickly as possible.182   
Expected rate limits appear to have a disproportionate impact on certain 
types of districts.  Property-poor districts, which have low assessed 
valuation per student, are more likely to be constrained by debt limits that 
are based on property values.183  Taxes collected at the expected rate limit 
will raise a lower amount of money per student in a property-poor district 
than in a wealthier one.184  An unsuccessful bill to amend Texas’s 
expected rate limit in 2015 would have increased the cap only for sixty 
school districts designated as fast-growing, suggesting that the authors of 
the bill believe these districts are particularly affected by the limit.185   
Of course, the other side of limits on expected tax rates is that they 
impose at least some constraint on future tax rates, because a district 
would not legally be able to incur its debt in such a form that it expected 
debt service to exceed those limits in any year.  Even though school 
districts have incentives to make optimistic assumptions about future 
valuation growth,186 districts are unlikely to make assumptions that have 
absolutely no basis. 
D. School Districts May Issue CABs to Meet the Needs of a Rapidly Growing 
Population 
Rapidly growing districts may be especially inclined to issue CABs.  As 
Fitch Ratings expressed, “For rapidly growing areas, the primary appeal [of 
 
REPORT, supra note 132, at 16; see CAL. EDUC. § 12001.6(C)(13) (Deering 2013) (stating QSCB 
allocations go back to the state after six months). 
182. ESI INT’L, INC., supra note 161, at 11, 14–15.  While the district undertook Poway 
Transaction to avoid exceeding a tax rate promised to voters rather than to comply with the expected 
rate limit, the principle is the same. 
183. ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83, at 11–12; c.f. Eric J. 
Brunner & Kim Rueben, Financing New School Construction and Modernization: Evidence from California, 
54 NAT’L TAX J. 527, 535–36 (2001) (discussing the same principle as would apply to the expected 
rate limit in the context of a limit on overall debt as a percentage of assessed value). 
184. ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83, at 11–12, 32. 
185. Tex. H.B. 506, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015); see Tex. H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. 
H.B. 506 84th Leg., R.S., at 3 (2015); see also infra Section IV.D. for discussion of fast-growing 
districts. 
186. See infra Section IV.E. (discussing incentives to make optimistic assumptions about future 
valuation growth and the impact of incorrect assumptions). 
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CABs] is that needed capital improvements can be funded immediately, 
but the repayment burden is shared with the larger future population.”187   
Furthermore, because there is generally a lag between increases in 
property values and increases in assessed valuations,188 student numbers 
may grow before the larger overall population is reflected in higher 
assessed valuations.  The Author’s/Sponsor’s Statement of Intent for 
HB 114 indicated that “[i]n recent years, Texas school districts and local 
government entities have increasingly turned to CABs because our 
growing populations are demanding new facilities and capital development 
that far outpace our local wealth and resources.  Usually, immediate 
development is needed but there are limited other financing 
options. . . .”189  Of the top ten public school districts in Texas based on 
maturity amount of CABs outstanding as of August 31, 2015,190 seven 
had enrollment growth (expressed as a percentage) above that of the state 
as a whole over the ten-year period from state fiscal year 2005–2014 and 
six had enrollment growth far above that of the state as a whole for that 
same period.191  This suggests a correlation between rapid growth and the 
use of CABs.  
 
187. Fitch Ratings Press Release, supra note 9. 
188. Byron F. Lutz, The Connection Between House Price Appreciation and Property Tax Revenues 
48 FIN. & ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES, Sept. 12, 2008, at 6–8, 12.  The lag between increases in 
property values and assessed values likely is higher in California, where there are strict limits on 
increases in assessed values absent a sale of the property. 
189. S. Comm. on Fin., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 114, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015). 
190. TBRB, 2015 REPORT, supra note 132, at 41. 
191. Statewide enrollment grew 17.2% over this period.  See TEX. EDUC. AGENCY,  
POCKET EDITION: 2004–05 TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOL STATISTICS (2005), https://rptsvr1. 
tea.texas.gov/perfreport/pocked/2005/pocked0405.pdf [http://perma.cc/8SBG-8ZRZ] (showing 
the statewide enrollment during the 2004–2005 school year); TEX. EDUC. AGENCY,  
POCKET EDITION: 2013–14 TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOL STATISTICS (2014), http://tea.texas.gov/ 
communications/pocket-edition/ [http://perma.cc/K72Z-QH2X] (detailing statewide enrollment 
for the 2013–2014 school year).  Over the same period, enrollment growth for each district, based on 
data in the indicated official statements, was as follows: Leander: 78.9%; Wylie: 77.8%; Forney: 
96.5%; Grand Prairie: 20.8%; Ennis: 4.4%; Frisco: 175.8%; Denton: 55.4%; Schertz-Cibolo-Universal 
City: 82.8%; Galena Park: 9.7%; and Irving: 10.1%.  LEANDER INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL 
STATEMENT DATED JUNE 4, 2015 app. B-2 (2015), http://emma.msrb.org/ER894732-EA566660-
EA962666.pdf [http://perma.cc/X6C9-EJEV]; WYLIE INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT 
DATED OCTOBER 7, 2015 app. B-2 (2015), http://emma.msrb.org/EP875003-EP677587-
EP1079225.pdf [http://perma.cc/JY4P-S3N4]; FORNEY INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT 
DATED JUNE 25, 2014 app A-1 (2014), https://emma.msrb.org/EA616377-EA482625-
EA879233.pdf [http://perma.cc/M82D-QH2Y]; GRAND PRAIRIE INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL 
STATEMENT DATED FEBRUARY 24, 2015 app. B-1 (2015), http://emma.msrb.org/EP847035-
EP655527-EP1057221.pdf [http://perma.cc/N24N-6JFS]; ENNIS INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL 
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It may be that rapidly growing districts are endeavoring to achieve 
interperiod equity through their use of CABs.  Because, in many cases, 
they are building to accommodate a student population that they expect to 
continue to grow, they may be trying to protect today’s population from 
having to pay for more infrastructure than it needs or can use, while 
providing for the needs of a larger future population.  These districts also 
may expect that their use of CABs will result in substantially level tax rates 
because they expect assessed valuations to grow with the population.  
Unfortunately, if growth does not occur as expected, it will be a small 
population in the future that bears the brunt of the decisions being made 
today.   
The limits on expected tax rates discussed above are a significant force 
pushing rapidly growing districts to issue CABs rather than CIBs.  As an 
official of a district in Texas that grew from 7,200 students in 1994 to 
36,750 in 2014 put it, “Yes, [using CABs] costs more, but when you’re at 
[the expected rate limit] and another 1,200 children come in, we think 
‘Where are we going to put them?’”192  They are not, however, the sole 
reason CABs are used.  In the State of Texas, for example, of the forty 
fastest-growing districts, eleven are at the $0.50 rate cap and nine are even 
lower, within $0.05 of it.193  The other half of these districts presumably 
 
STATEMENT DATED APRIL 14, 2015 app B-3 (2015), http://emma.msrb.org/ER867185-EA558387-
EA954554.pdf [http://perma.cc/922N-JYZF]; FRISCO INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT 
DATED NOVEMBER 10, 2015 app. B-4 (2015), http://emma.msrb.org/EP887477-EP687043-
EP1088743.pdf [http://perma.cc/WZ5G-CY5J]; DENTON INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL 
STATEMENT DATED AUGUST 4, 2015 app. B-1 (2015), http://emma.msrb.org/EA740427-
EA580195-EA976220.pdf [http://perma.cc/GNY5-MCUZ]; SCHERTZ-CIBOLO-UNIVERSAL CITY 
INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 app. B-2 (2014), 
http://emma.msrb.org/EP831962-EP644201-EP1045821.pdf [http://perma.cc/AE26-L62A]; 
GALENA PARK INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT DATED FEBRUARY 7, 2007 app. B-2 
(2007), http://emma.msrb.org/MS256496-MS231804-MD451932.pdf [http://perma.cc/27PP-
MX4V]; GALENA PARK INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT DATED JUNE 24, 2015 app. B-3 
(2015), http://emma.msrb.org/ER902702-ER705499-ER1107106.pdf [http://perma.cc/L7MM-
X8JA]; IRVING INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT DATED DECEMBER 10, 2014 app. B-1 
(2014), http://emma.msrb.org/ER825383-ER638136-ER1039800.pdf [http://perma.cc/78ST-
4N72].  These districts ranged in size from less than 6,000 students to more than 45,000 students in 
state fiscal year 2014. 
192. Batheja, supra note 169 (quoting Ellen Skoviera, Assistant Superintendent for Business 
and Operations, Leander Independent School District); see Fitch Ratings Press Release, supra note 9 
(discussing the benefits to growing districts that come with CABs, but also identifying potential 
risks); see also Lisheron, supra note 12 (noting CABs have been used to accommodate expected 
“exploding growth” in student numbers). 
193. MOAK, CASEY & ASSOCS., FINDING BALANCE: A GUIDE TO ENROLLMENT, DEBT, & 
STATE FACILITIES SUPPORT, A REPORT BY THE FAST GROWTH SCHOOL COALITION TO THE 85TH 
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are using CABs for reasons other than to comply with the expected rate 
limit.   
E. The Impact of Incorrect Assumptions About Growth in Assessed Valuations 
When assessed valuations decline or do not increase as was projected at 
the time a bond measure was proposed, districts are more likely to issue 
CABs to maintain tax rates at desired levels or to comply with expected 
rate limits while completing promised projects.  In California, statewide 
assessed valuations declined in fiscal year 2009–2010 for the first time 
since the State Board of Equalization began keeping records in 1933.194  
This likely contributed to the significant increase in the aggregate principal 
amount of CABs issued by California school districts—both in absolute 
terms and as a percentage of all general obligation bonds issued—from 
2007 to 2011.195  Furthermore, districts and their advisors have incentives 
to use, and sometimes do use, optimistic assumptions about assessed 
valuation growth when providing estimated tax rates in order to increase 
the likelihood that the bond measure will pass.196  
Equally, if not more troubling, district officials and their advisors have 
incentives to use aggressive assumptions about assessed valuation growth 
when evaluating whether taxes for debt service are expected to be within 
 
TEXAS LEGISLATURE 10 (2016), http://fastgrowthtexas.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/ 
FastGrowth_Interim_Report_2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/284N-75DV]. 
194. Press Release, Cal. Bd. Of Equalization 4th Dist. – Los Angeles, Total Statewide 
Property Values Decline (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.boe.ca.gov/news/2009/73-09.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/G2ZR-QF7K]. 
195. While the aggregate principal amount of general obligation bonds issued by California 
school districts declined from approximately $6.6 billion in 2007 to $5.1 billion in 2011, the principal 
amount of these bonds issued as CABs increased from approximately $540 million in 2007 to 
$1.1 billion in 2011.  CDIAC data includes 192 school district general obligation bond issuances (80 
of which included CABs) in 2007 and 274 school district general obligation bond issuances (89 of 
which included CABs) in 2011.  See Jensen, Calif. Capital Appreciation Bonds Have Unintended 
Consequences, supra note 13 (describing declining real estate values as a reason that some school 
districts issued CABs); see also Cal. Assemb., Bill Analysis (Sept. 5, 2013), Assemb. B. 182, 2013–14 
Leg., Reg. Sess., at 3 (Cal. 2013) (noting CABs became more popular after home prices declined); Cal. 
S. Educ. Comm., Bill Analysis (June 24, 2013), Assemb. B. 182, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 3–4 
(Cal. 2013) (attributing increased use of CABs to lower housing prices); L.A. CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY 
REPORT, supra note 86, at 127 (indicating all twelve of the school districts that issued CABs reviewed 
in the report had experienced slower assessed valuation growth or even assessed valuation decline). 
196. See SCOTT, supra note 49, at 23 (describing an example of aggressive assumptions about 
assessed valuation growth).  As of 2017, California law requires school boards calling for a bond 
election to obtain assessed valuation projections that take into consideration projections of the 
county assessor.  Assemb. B. 2116, 2015–16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
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the rates previously promised to voters and whether a bond issuance 
complies with the expected rate limit.  Using aggressive assumptions 
allows districts to issue more bonds, and the fallout of higher tax rates will 
land on future, rather than current, officials and taxpayers. 
California law (unlike Texas law) does not provide guidance on what 
assumptions are to be used in projecting assessed valuations for purposes 
of calculating compliance with the expected rate limit.197  The Orange 
County Grand Jury reviewed assumptions about estimated tax rates for 
three school districts in the county that issued CABs; it concluded that all 
three had assumed unreasonably high growth in assessed valuations, and 
that the taxpayers in these districts were likely to have to pay taxes in 
excess of the expected rate limit in the future.198 
In Texas, if a district’s actual tax rate is higher than projected and 
exceeds the expected rate limit, that district is subject to a lower limit in 
the future.199  The impact of this penalty is not clear.  On one hand, it 
may encourage districts to use conservative assumptions about assessed 
valuation growth or to use historic, rather than projected assessed 
valuation, in determining compliance.200  Most districts in Texas use the 
historic test.201  On the other hand, it may encourage some districts to use 
financing structures in which the bulk of the debt service is not due until at 
or near maturity—including, at the extreme, long-term CABs—to 
postpone the risk of exceeding the limit. 
 
197. A 2010 bill in California would have imposed broad limits on the growth that could be 
assumed in projections for determining compliance with the expected rate limit, but it did not pass.  
Assemb. B. 2552, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010).  While it does not apply directly to 
calculating compliance with the expected rate limit, AB 2116 may impact the projections used by 
school districts for determining compliance.  This bill is discussed supra note 196, and infra note 300 
and accompanying text. 
198. ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83, at 4. 
199. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 45.0031(e) (West 2013). 
200. See ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83, at 4 (claiming school 
districts would likely not exceed the mandated tax rate if they were conservative in their growth 
assumptions for assessed values). 
201. For example, data from the TBRB indicates seventy-five school districts issued general 
obligation bonds in August 2015.  TBRB Issuances FY 2007–2015, supra note 9.  Official statements 
for sixty of the school districts indicated that the districts had not used projected property values to 
satisfy the test, three stated that they had and five were silent.  See Texas, ELECTRONIC MUNICIPAL 
MARKET ACCESS https://emma.msrb.org/IssuerHomePage/State?state=TX [https://perma.cc/ 
E8CJ-3ZP8] (providing information for Texas municipal securities issuers including issuers’ official 
statements).  Official statements for the remaining seven were not available.  Id. 
42
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 2, Art. 3
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss2/3
  
2018] GETTING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WHERE THEY NEED TO GO 405 
F. Texas Par-to-Par Requirement for Refundings 
Texas school districts may not issue general obligation refunding bonds 
without obtaining voter approval unless the principal amount of the 
refunding bonds is no greater than the principal amount of the bonds 
being refinanced.202  This means school districts need to generate original 
issue premium to pay costs of issuing the refunding bonds and to pay 
interest on the refinanced bonds through their maturity or redemption 
date.203  This amount can be significant, particularly for bonds that are 
refinanced far in advance of their redemption or maturity date.204  One 
way Texas school districts comply with this requirement is by issuing 
CABs that generate significant original issue premium.205  
G. School District Officials May Not Understand the Impact of CABs 
It appears that in some instances, school district boards do not 
understand what capital appreciation bonds are, what their impact is, or 
even that they are being issued.  Many school board members do not have 
the experience and background to understand the impact of CABs, at least 
not without explanation and guidance from district officials and outside 
financial advisors.  While school board members frequently are committed, 
intelligent, and educated individuals who work hard for their school 
districts, the legal qualifications for serving are minimal.206   
 
202. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3(e); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 1207.003(b) (West 2012);  
see LAWRENCE FIN. CONSULTING LLC, PUBLIC FINANCE UPDATE 1 (2013), 
http://www.lfctexas.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/April-2013-Issue.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
H424-N8DP] (noting school districts must abide by the par-to-par requirement). 
203. See LAWRENCE FIN. CONSULTING LLC, supra note 202, at 1 (describing how CABs are 
used by school districts to meet the par-to-par requirement for refunding). 
204. See id. (noting the high interest expenses for advance refunded bonds). 
205. See id. (claiming school districts must use CABs to cover issuance costs and interest 
amounts on advance refunded bonds); see also NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, WHAT HAPPENED IN 
AUSTIN: 10 NEW LAWS THAT MATTER 17–18 (2015), http://www.nortonrosefulbright. 
com/files/20150722-what-happened-in-austin-ten-new-laws-that-matter-130804.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/B9WL-FBDD] (suggesting the par-to-par test partially explains why “Texas[] school districts are 
the largest issuer of capital appreciation bonds”). 
206. In California, anyone who is at least eighteen years old, a citizen of California, a resident 
of the school district, a registered voter, and not disqualified under the California Constitution or 
state law from holding civil office, is eligible.  CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35107(a) (Deering 2013).  In 
Texas, anyone who is a U.S. citizen, at least eighteen years old, has not been determined by a final 
court judgment to be mentally incapacitated, has not been convicted of a felony, and has resided in 
Texas for twelve months and in the territory where the office is located for six months, is eligible.  
TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 141.001(a) (West 2015). 
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Further, in many cases, school boards are presented with bond 
resolutions that authorize the issuance of both CIBs and CABs; they then 
delegate to their officers the decision of which type of bonds will be issued 
and the terms of the bonds (within specified parameters).207  These 
decisions typically are not made until closer to the time the bonds are sold 
and after the board has approved the transaction because market 
conditions affect the final structure.   
Then California State Treasurer, Bill Lockyer, and California 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, Tom Torlakson, noted that school 
board members and the public have not always been fully informed about 
the costs and risks associated with CABs.208  Some school board members 
have stated that they could not recall approving CABs or were not aware 
of the impacts of issuing them.209   
The failure to count compounded interest against voter-authorized 
amounts and against the California limit on total debt as a percentage of 
assessed valuation exacerbates the problem by making the true level of 
debt created by these bonds less apparent.210   
Furthermore, school district officers and employees may not have 
sufficient experience to understand the full impact of CABs, at least 
 
207. See Leander Indep. Sch. Dist., Res. Authorizing The Issuance, Sale and Delivery of 
Leander Independent School District Unlimited Tax Refunding Bonds, in One Or More Series; 
Authorizing Preparation of an Official Statement; Authorizing a Pricing Officer to Approve the 
Amount, Interest Rates, Price, Redemption Provisions and Other Terms Thereof and Certain Other 
Procedures and Provisions Related Thereto; and Containing Other Matters Related Thereto, at 6 
(2015), https://v3.boardbook.org/Public/PublicItemDownload.aspx?ik=37700942 [https://perma. 
cc/W7NM-YB2K] (appointing an officer to determine the types of bonds to be issued); San Carlos 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., Res. No. 8:15/16, at 7 (2015), sancarlos.agendaonline.net/ 
public/Meeting/Attachments/DisplayAttachment.aspx?AttachmentID=217007&IsArchive=0 
[https://perma.cc/LC8F-CPRR] (declaring an authorized officer has the power to approve bonds in 
the form of CABs, CIBs or Convertible CABs).  Notably, one school district’s bond resolution 
granted broad authority to authorized officers to determine the terms of the bonds within 
parameters, but specified that CIBs be used to the maximum extent “determined . . . to be in the best 




208. Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Educ., State Schools Chief Tom Torlakson, State Treasurer 
Bill Lockyer Caution School Districts Against Issuance of Capital Appreciation Bonds (Jan. 17, 2013) 
[hereinafter Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Educ.], http://www.cde.ca.gov/nr/ne/yr13/yr13rel12.asp 
[https://perma.cc/4823-9MQL]. 
209. Shifflett, Pieczenik, & Bundy, supra note 148; Lambert & Reese, supra note 165. 
210. See supra Section III.C. 
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without guidance from outside financial advisors.211  Most cities and 
counties have few resources dedicated to debt management, and their 
external financial advisors frequently know more about bonds—and even 
about the issuer’s own debt portfolio—than the issuers do;212 the same is 
likely true of school districts, particularly smaller ones.  Even large issuers 
don’t always understand the agreements they make.213  Smaller 
communities tend to have smaller financial staffs, and the differences in 
capacity are likely to impact management of the issuer’s debt.214  An 
empirical study of municipal bond sales in Oregon concluded that small 
communities pay higher interest rates on their general obligation bonds 
than larger communities, all else being equal, and attributed this to them 
having more limited staffs with less expertise.215  Smaller school districts 
likely confront the same issues—particularly when evaluating a less 
common financing structure like CABs.  
Recognizing their lack of in-house expertise, school districts and other 
local governments often engage an external financial advisor.216  Among 
other things, financial advisors assist issuers in developing a financing plan, 
 
211. See SAN MATEO CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY, CAPITAL APPRECIATION BONDS: TICKING 
TIME BOMBS 7 (2013), http://www.sanmateocourt.org/documents/grand_jury/2012/bonds.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G6D9-6AZT] (“A southern California school chief business officer lamented the 
lack of financial expertise that leaves many districts unqualified to navigate complex bond deals – or 
to do business with high-powered financial advisers[:] ‘They’re swimming with the sharks . . . .  These 
are principals and assistant superintendents of curriculum, and they’re being promoted to the role of 
a chief business officer.’”). 
212. Monique Moyer, Current Issues Facing Bond Issuers and Their Financial Advisors, MUN. FIN. J., 
Summer 2003, at 17, 18; see also U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 
STATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL DEBT MANAGEMENT 9–11 (1965) [hereinafter U.S. 
ADVISORY COMM’N, STATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL DEBT MANAGEMENT] (examining 
the difficulty smaller communities have with bonds due to their lack of expertise); Ang & Green, 
supra note 77, at 8 (“Furthermore, when municipalities negotiate with investment banks and other 
financial intermediaries to issue debt, municipalities often have less expertise and relatively few 
resources to guide their decision[-]making.  This is detrimental not only to investors, but also to 
municipalities themselves.”); Jayaraman Vijayakumar & Kenneth N. Daniels, The Role and Impact of 
Financial Advisors in the Market for Municipal Bonds, 30 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 43, 44 (2006) (stating local 
communities often lack the sophistication and knowledge to navigate the debt issuance process and, 
therefore, utilize financial advisors to assist them). 
213. See Stephan Whitaker, Financial Innovations and Issuer Sophistication in Municipal Securities 
Markets 4 (Fed. Res. Bank of Clev., Working Paper No. 14–04, 2014) (identifying this as a contributor 
to the Orange County, California and Detroit, Michigan bankruptcies). 
214. Bill Simonsen et al., The Influence of Jurisdiction Size and Sale Type on Municipal Bond Interest 
Rates: An Empirical Analysis, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 709, 710–11 (2001). 
215. Id. at 713–15. 
216. Vijayakumar & Daniels, supra note 212, at 44. 
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structuring transactions, and negotiating with underwriters.217  In some 
cases, financial advisors receive fees that are either contingent on the 
closing of the bond financing, tied to the size of the issuance, or both 
(though California law prohibits compensation of financial advisors based 
on a percentage of the amount of bonds sold).218   
Municipal bonds are typically sold to the public through an investment 
bank acting as an underwriter.219  The underwriter’s compensation is a 
percentage of the total principal amount sold.   
The MSRB, which regulates underwriters and other participants in the 
municipal securities market, notes that “compensation that is contingent 
on the closing of a transaction or the size of a transaction presents a 
conflict of interest, because it may cause the underwriter to recommend a 
transaction that it is unnecessary or to recommend that the size of the 
transaction be larger than is necessary.”220  The same analysis applies to 
financial advisors that are compensated in this manner.   
While the vast majority of financial advisors and underwriters are 
honorable, experienced professionals, there may be instances in which 
financial advisors and underwriters encourage school districts to issue 
bonds—including CABs—when it is not in their best interest to do so, 
either because they are maximizing their compensation or because they are 
too focused on their clients’ short-term objectives.  Concerns about the 
manipulation of local governments by financial advisors led to the passage 
of federal legislation in 2010 that required these advisors to register with 
the SEC, imposed fiduciary duties on them, and instructed the MSRB to 
 
217. A 2003 study found that using a financial advisor reduced underwriter compensation for 
negotiated general obligation bond offerings.  Id. at 66.   
218. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53592 (Deering 2011). 
219. Bonds are sold in either a competitive or negotiated sale.  In a competitive sale, an issuer 
sells the bonds to the lowest bidding underwriter.  In a negotiated sale, the issuer selects an 
underwriter to purchase the bonds on negotiated terms.  In both cases, the underwriter then sells the 
bonds to investors.  Typically, an underwriter in a negotiated sale plays a much more active role in 
the transaction than would an underwriter in a competitive sale.  Negotiated sales are by far the most 
common sale method for California and Texas school district general obligation bonds, based on 
data provided by CDIAC.  California Issuances 2015, supra note 9; Local Publications – Bond Issuance, 
TEX. BOND REV. BD., http://www.brb.state.tx.us/publications_local.aspx#BI [https://perma.cc/ 
444R-FYDC]. 
220. MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., RULE G-17 CONDUCT OF MUNICIPAL SECURITIES  
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regulate them.221  Similar concerns about underwriters have led to 
increased regulation of underwriters, including requirements that 
underwriters disclose conflicts of interest to issuers.222  
V.    CALIFORNIA AND TEXAS LEGISLATION LIMITING THE USE OF CABS 
A. Opposition to CABs  
School districts in California and Texas have issued general obligation 
bonds in the form of CABs since at least the 1990s.223  Changes to 
California law that took effect in January 2010 eliminated the requirement 
that bonds issued under the relevant California Government Code 
provisions (including school district bonds with final maturity dates in 
excess of twenty-five years) generally had to have substantially level debt 
service.224  This had the effect of making it easier for school districts to 
issue CABs with final maturity dates later than twenty-five years after the 
date of issuance.  The percentage of California school district general 
obligation bond issuances—consisting in whole or in part of CABs and 
with final maturities later than twenty-five years after the date of 
issuance—increased significantly beginning in 2010.225   
Capital appreciation bonds began receiving negative attention in both 
California and Texas in 2012 and 2013.  Newspapers and web sites 
published articles with titles like: “Risky Bonds Tie Schools to Huge 
 
221. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 975 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4) (West 2010) (“[W]ith respect to municipal advisors—
[the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board shall] prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent 
acts, practices, and courses of business as are not consistent with a municipal advisor’s fiduciary duty 
to its clients[.]”). 
222. See MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., RULE G-17, supra note 220, at 2–3 (describing fair 
dealing and requiring that underwriters disclose conflicts of interest to issuers). 
223. See ELECTRONIC MUN. MKT. ACCESS (EMMA), https://emma.msrb.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/522H-DPJY] (providing data on the history of CAB issuances). 
224. Assemb. B. 1388, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009).  There were exceptions under 
prior law, including for issuances that made amortization of overall general obligation bond debt 
more level.  Id. 
225. Of school district general obligation issuances that included CABs, the following 
percentages had final maturity dates in excess of twenty-five years: 21% in 2007, 33% in 2008, 24% in 
2009, 64% in 2010, 72% in 2011, 80% in 2012, 69% in 2013, 70% in 2014, and 58% in 2015; as a 
result of the passage of AB 182, final maturities in excess of twenty-five years in 2014 and 2015 
would have to be CIBs, CABs issued to refinance outstanding bonds, or CABs qualifying for limited 
transition period exceptions.  California Issuances 2002–2014 (2015) (unpublished data) (on file with 
author); California Issuances 2015, supra note 9. 
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Debt;”226 “California Schools Finance Upgrades by Making the Next 
Generation Pay;”227 and “Texas Schools Pass Debt on to the Next 
Generation.”228  The California State Treasurer and State Superintendent 
of Public Instruction issued a joint letter urging school districts not to 
issue any CABs until the state legislature and the Governor completed 
their consideration of reform proposals.229  Grand juries in three 
California counties investigated the use of CABs in their counties and 
issued scathing reports.230   
A bill was unsuccessfully introduced in California in 2013 that declared 
the legislature’s intent to ban the use of CABs by school districts.231  In 
Texas, bills were unsuccessfully introduced in 2013, 2014 and early 2015, 
which would have prohibited or limited the use of CABs that are payable 
from property taxes.232   
While those efforts did not succeed, California law was amended 
effective January 2014 to restrict the use of CABs by school districts and 
community college districts;233 and Texas law was modified effective 
September 2015 to constrain the use of CABs by all local governments.234 
 
226. Weikel, supra note 12. 
227. Lovett, supra note 12. 
228. Lisheron, supra note 12. 
229. Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 208. 
230. SAN DIEGO CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL DISTRICT DILEMMA: BONDS OR BONDAGE? 
(2013), http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov/grandjury/reports/2012-2013/School_District_Dilemma_ 
Bonds_Bondage.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EFQ-7Z5F]; SAN MATEO CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY, supra 
note 211; SANTA CLARA CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY, OUR SCHOOL DISTRICTS DO NOT NEED ZEROS 
(2013), http://www.scscourt.org/court_divisions/civil/cgj/2013/SchoolDistrictZeros.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/A9UK-HXGJ].  The Orange County, Contra Costa County, and Los Angeles County 
grand juries also released reports on capital appreciation bonds, but not until after AB 182 had 
passed.  ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83; CONTRA COSTA CTY. CIV. 
GRAND JURY, CAPITAL APPRECIATION BONDS (2015), http://www.cc-courts.org/civil/docs/ 
grandjury/Report_1501_ComplianceAndContinuityCommitteeReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8N3-
33S7]; L.A. CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 86. 
231. S.B. 685, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). 
232. Tex. H.B. 3416, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013); Tex. S.B. 449, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013); Tex. H.B. 83, 
83d Leg., C.S. (2013); Tex. S.B. 103, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015); Tex. H.B. 1750, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015); 
Tex. H.B. 2099, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015). 
233. Community college districts are similar to school districts, but provide two-year tertiary 
education.  Cal. Cmty. Colls. Chancellor’s Office, Board of Governors, CA.GOV, http://extranet.cccco. 
edu/SystemOperations/BoardofGovernors.aspx [https://perma.cc/BJ88-UZ2T]. 
234. Assemb. B. 182, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., 
R.S., ch. 991, §§ 1–3, sec. 1201.0245, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 3517, 3519 (codified at TEX. GOV’T 
CODE § 1201.0245). 
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B. Limits on CABs in California 
California AB 182 took effect in January 2014.235  The legislation 
narrowed the parameters within which school districts and community 
college districts (but not other local governments) could issue general 
obligation new money CABs.236  In particular, the new law reduced the 
maximum term for these CABs from forty to twenty-five years,237 and the 
maximum interest rate on these CABs from 12% to 8%.238  In addition, 
AB 182 added a requirement that general obligation new money CABs 
with terms of more than ten years be subject to redemption at the option 
of the issuer no later than ten years after their date of issuance. 239  This 
means that rather than having to keep its CABs outstanding through their 
final maturity, a school district would be able to repay them after ten years, 
should it desire to do so, without having to negotiate with bondholders or 
obtain their consent.  AB 182 also added a requirement that the ratio of 
debt service (for CABs, the maturity amount) to principal for a series of 
CABs not exceed four to one.240   
Like governing boards of all local governments in California, school 
boards are subject to open meeting and public notice requirements.241  
AB 182 added additional notice and information requirements for school 
board approvals of general obligation new money CABs issuances.242  
Public notice of the proposed approval of a general obligation new money 
CABs issuance must be given for two consecutive school board 
 
235. Assemb. B. 182, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). 
236. The State Board of Education may waive these provisions for bonds that refinance bond 
anticipation notes issued before December 31, 2013, if certain conditions are met.  CAL. EDUC. 
CODE § 15144.3 (Deering Supp. 2017). 
237. CAL. EDUC. § 15144 (Deering 2013); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 53508(f), 53508.5 
(Deering 2011 & Supp. 2017). 
238. CAL. EDUC. § 15143 (Deering 2013); CAL. GOV’T §§ 53508(d), 53508.5, 53531 (Deering 
2011 & Supp. 2017). 
239. CAL. EDUC. § 15144.2 (Deering 2016); CAL. GOV’T § 53508.5.  Presumably, this option 
has some cost in the form of higher yields, particularly when interest rates are high, since it creates 
the risk that investors will have to reinvest not only earning on, but also principal of, the CABs in 
lower yielding securities before the scheduled maturity date of the CABs. 
240. CAL. EDUC. § 15144.1 (Deering Supp. 2017); CAL. GOV’T § 53508.5. 
241. See CAL. GOV’T §§ 54950–54963 (Deering 2016) (defining “local agency” as including 
“school district[s] . . . or any board, commission or agency thereof” and stating the chapter’s 
provisions for open and public meetings). 
242. These requirements also apply to CIBs that mature more than 30 years after issuance.  
CAL. GOV’T § 53508.6 (Deering Supp. 2017). 
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meetings,243 and the resolution approved by the school board authorizing 
the issuance must include the financing term and time of maturity, the 
ratio of debt service to principal, and the estimated change in assessed 
value of taxable property in the district over the term of the bonds.244  In 
addition, the board must be presented information concerning the overall 
cost of the CABs, a comparison to the overall cost of CIBs, the reason 
CABs are being recommended, and a copy of required disclosures 
regarding underwriter conflicts of interest.245   
The provisions of AB 182 do not apply to bonds that are issued to 
refinance existing debt.  In California, school districts may issue general 
obligation refunding bonds only if they result in overall debt service 
savings246 and do not mature any later than the bonds that are being 
refinanced.247   
C. Limits on CABs in Texas  
Texas HB 114 took effect September 1, 2015.248  HB 114 applies to 
CABs issued by local governments and secured by ad valorem taxes.249  
HB 114 reduced the maximum term of CABs from forty to twenty 
years.250  The new law also added a provision that allows CABs to be 
issued only if the total debt service on all the local government’s general 
obligation CABs will be no more than 25% of total debt service on all the 
local government’s outstanding general obligation bonds.251   
Texas local government boards, like those in California, are subject to 
open meeting and public notice requirements.252  HB 114 imposed 
additional informational requirements for the issuance of CABs.253  
Specifically, governing boards must receive information about the total 
 
243. CAL. EDUC. § 15146(b)(2) (Deering 2016); CAL. GOV’T § 53508.5. 
244. CAL. EDUC. § 15146(b)(1)(E) (Deering 2016); CAL. GOV’T § 53508.5. 
245. CAL. EDUC. § 15146(c) (Deering 2016); CAL. GOV’T § 53508.5. 
246. CAL. GOV’T § 53552 (Deering 2011). 
247. Id. § 53553(e). 
248. Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 991, §§ 1–3, sec. 1201.0245, 2015 Tex. Gen. 
Laws 3517, 3519 (codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1201.0245). 
249. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 1201.0245(b) (West Supp. 2017). 
250. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 45.001(b) (West 2012); TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245(b)(1) (West 
Supp. 2017). 
251. TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245(g) (West Supp. 2017). 
252. TEX. GOV’T §§ 551.001–551.146 (West 2017 & Supp. 2017). 
253. Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 991, § 1, sec. 1201.0245, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 
3517, 3519 (codified at TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245). 
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debt service to maturity, the fees to be paid to financing team members 
and other outside vendors, the projected tax impact and assumptions on 
which the projected tax impact is based.254  The governing board also 
must determine whether there are any potential conflicts of interest with 
any of the professionals involved in the bond issuance.255  Amended 
Texas law also requires that local governments post information about the 
proposed issuance and existing debt, including the information described 
in the two preceding sentences, to their websites and update the 
information about outstanding debt and total debt service regularly.256   
As of September 1, 2017, general obligation refunding bonds are 
exempted from the requirements of HB 114.257  HB 114 prohibits local 
governments from extending the maturity date of CABs, including by 
refinancing them, unless the extension reduces the amount of debt service 
payable through maturity or in other limited circumstances.258  Unlike 
California law, Texas law does not otherwise prohibit extending the 
maturity of refinanced general obligation bonds and allows refunding 
transactions that do not result in debt service savings if the governing 
body of the issuer makes a finding that the issuance is in the best interests 
of the issuer.259   
D. Comparing the Two Approaches 
There are significant similarities between the California and Texas CAB 
legislation.  Both reduce the maximum term of capital appreciation 
 
254. TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245(b)(2) (West Supp. 2017). 
255. Id. § 1201.0245(b)(3). 
256. Id. §§ 1201.0245(b)(4), (d). 
257. Act of May 22, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 529, § 1, sec. 1201.0245(j), 2015 Tex. Sess. Law 
Serv. (codified at TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245(j)).  The amendment addressed unintended consequences 
of HB 114, such as prohibiting issuers that were already over the 25% limit from issuing refunding 
CABs unless the refunding brought the issuer below the limit, even if the refunding resulted in a 
lower debt service attributable to CABs and debt service savings, with limited exceptions. 
258. TEX. GOV’T §§ 1201.0245(h), (i) (West Supp. 2017).  But note that refunding bonds 
issued under Chapter 1207 of the Government Code are not subject to Section 1201.0245, as recently 
amended.  Act of May 22, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 529, § 1, sec. 1201.0245(j), 2015 Tex. Sess. Law 
Serv. (codified at TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245(j)). 
259. TEX GOV’T. § 1207.008 (West 2012).  However, refunding bonds guaranteed by the 
Texas Permanent School Fund Bond Guarantee Program cannot have a later final maturity date than 
the bonds they are refinancing and must result in present value debt service savings.  19 TEX. 
ADMIN. § 33.65(d)(2)(C) (2017).  Most Texas school district bonds are guaranteed by this program.  
See TEXAS PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND DISCLOSURE STATEMENT, supra note 32 and accompanying 
text. 
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bonds,260 likely in response to concerns about the higher cost of CABs 
and possibly, to some extent, to address concerns about interperiod equity 
(though this remains an issue even with the shorter terms).  Both include 
additional information requirements and, while those requirements are not 
identical, both require the provision of information about overall debt 
service and the assumptions that are being made about growth in assessed 
valuations,261 suggesting that these are important for both governing 
board members and the public.  Further, both endeavor to make the 
public more aware of the issuance of CABs and the impact on the district’s 
debt service levels and on property taxes.  California requires the issuance 
of CABs to be discussed at two board meetings for which public notice 
has been given and requires certain information be presented to the 
board.262  Texas goes further and requires that, in addition to being 
presented to the board, information must be posted on the issuer’s website 
and updated regularly.263  Both pieces of legislation require disclosure to 
the board of conflicts of interest,264 likely in response to concerns that 
issuers are being encouraged to issue CABs when it is not in their best 
interests to do so. 
General obligation refunding bonds need not comply with the new 
limitations in either California or Texas.265  This is likely because the 
expectation is that refunding bonds are issued only if they result in overall 
debt service savings to taxpayers.  As noted above, in California this is the 
only circumstance in which general obligation refunding bonds can be 
issued.266  While Texas law allows refunding transactions that do not 
result in debt service savings, the vast majority of refunding transactions 
probably create savings for two reasons: (1) it is a requirement for bonds 
 
260. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15144 (Deering 2013); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 53508(f), 53508.5 
(Deering 2011 & Supp. 2017); TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245(b)(1) (West Supp. 2017); TEX. EDUC. CODE 
ANN. § 45.001(b) (West 2012). 
261. CAL. EDUC. §§ 15146(b)–(c) (Deering 2013); CAL. GOV’T § 53508.5; TEX. GOV’T 
§§ 1201.0245(b), (d). 
262. CAL. EDUC. §§ 15146(b)–(c); CAL. GOV’T § 53508.5. 
263. TEX. GOV’T §§ 1201.0245(b), (d). 
264. CAL. EDUC. § 15146(c)(4) (Deering 2013); TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245(b)(3); CAL. GOV’T 
§ 53508.5. 
265. See Act of May 23, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S. ch. 529, §§1–3, sec. 1201.245(j), 2017 Tex. Sess. 
Law Serv. (West) (to be codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1201.245(j)) (exempting refunding CABs 
from additional restrictions effective September 1, 2017). 
266. See CAL. GOV’T §§ 53552, 53553(e) (Deering 2016) (stating California school districts 
may issue general obligation refunding bonds only if they result in overall debt service savings and do 
not mature later than the bonds that are being refinanced). 
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to be guaranteed by the Texas Permanent School Fund Bond Guarantee 
Program; and (2) because if they do not create savings, board members 
must make a public determination to proceed despite the increased 
costs.267  School districts in California and, in most instances, in Texas, 
may not extend the maturity of previously issued CABs.268   
One significant difference between the two laws is that the California 
limits apply only to school districts and community college districts, while 
the Texas limits apply to all local governments.269  This may be because 
school districts and community college districts dominate general 
obligation bond issuances in California in a way that they do not in 
Texas,270 presumably a reflection of the fact that school districts and 
community college districts in California can use the California 55% 
Regime, while other California local governments must use the California 
Two-Thirds Regime.271  In both states, the controversy surrounding 
CABs focused on school districts; and school districts were responsible for 
 
267. TEX. GOV’T § 1207.008 (West 2012); 19 TEX. ADMIN. § 33.65(d)(2)(C) (2017).  Most 
Texas school district bonds are guaranteed by the Texas Permanent School Fund Bond Guarantee 
Program. 
268. Refunding bonds guaranteed by the Texas Permanent School Fund Bond Guarantee 
Program cannot have a later final maturity date than the bonds they are refinancing.  19 TEX. 
ADMIN. § 33.65(d)(2)(C).  Most Texas school district bonds are guaranteed by this program.  See U.S. 
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 35. 
269. Compare CAL GOV’T § 53508.5 (imposing capital appreciation bond limits on school and 
community college districts), with Tex. Gov’t § 1201.0245(b) (West Supp. 2017) (restricting authority 
to issue capital appreciation bonds for a broad range of local governmental bodies). 
270. School districts and community college districts were responsible for 95.1% of California 
local government general obligation bond issuances and 89.5% of the total principal amount of such 
bonds issued in 2015.  See CDIAC, 2015 SUMMARY, supra note 28, at 2–4 (showing community 
college and K–12 school districts issued $13,512,973,914 of $15,095,823,914 in aggregate principal 
amount of government general obligation bonds in 409 transactions out of a total of 430 local 
government general obligation bond issuance in 2016).  School districts and community college 
districts were responsible for 57.9% of the outstanding principal amount of debt supported by ad 
valorem property taxes in Texas as of August 31, 2015.  See 2016 TEX. BOND REV. BD., LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2016), www.brb.state.tx.us/pub/lgs/fy2016/2016LocalARFinal. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/H3QB-NCUB] (detailing public school and community college districts held 
$78,278.3 million of $135,185.1 million in local government debt).  While these figures are not 
entirely comparable, they suggest that local governments other than school districts and community 
college districts, issue a significantly greater proportion of general obligation bonds in Texas than 
they do in California. 
271. See DAYTON, supra note 42, at 16 (noting only 110 of the 1,147 local educational bond 
measures from 2001 through 2014 were presented to voters under the California Two-Thirds 
Regime).  All Texas local government general obligation bonds are subject to approval by a majority 
of residents voting at an election.  TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3(e); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN § 45.003(a) 
(West 2012). 
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most of the CABs issued in the five years leading up to the passage of the 
relevant legislation.272  Both pieces of legislation are limited to bonds that 
are paid from ad valorem property taxes.273   
Another notable difference is that Texas legislation focuses on the 
issuer’s overall debt portfolio, while California legislation focuses on the 
cost of a series of CABs in isolation.  Even though both states place limits 
on debt service, Texas compares debt service on CABs to overall debt 
service, while California evaluates the debt service on each series of CABs 
in isolation.274  This is generally consistent with the two states’ approaches 
to expected rate limits; the focus in Texas is on overall debt portfolio and 
the focus in California is on a more limited universe (a series of bonds in 
the case of the ratio of total debt service to principal, and bonds 
authorized at a single election in the case of expected rate limits).  It is 
surprising, though, that the California test looks at the series of bonds on 
its own and not in conjunction with all the bonds that are issued at the 
same time, or at all the bonds that were authorized at a particular election.   
VI.    WHAT IS THE SOLUTION? 
There are several ways that misuse of CABs could be—and in the case 
of AB 182 and HB 114, has been—addressed.  This section discusses 
several potential solutions, which fall within three broad categories: 
prohibiting or restricting the use of CABs; reducing the incentives to issue 
CABs; and providing additional information to local governments and 
communities, and additional guidance to local governments.  While this 
discussion is focused on school districts, the analysis also applies to other 
local governments.   
 
272. Based on data provided to the author by CDIAC, school districts in California were 
responsible for 72.5% of the aggregate principal amount of CABs issued in California during the 
period from 2008 to 2012.  In Texas, 65.5% of the total principal amount of CABs issued during the 
period from state fiscal years 2009 through 2013 were issued by public school districts.  See TBRB, 
2013 REPORT, supra note 131, at 10 (computing the percentages by adding the public-school district 
CAB amount for fiscal years 2009–2013 and dividing that number by the total principal amount of 
CABs issued for fiscal years 2009–2013). 
273. TEX. GOVT. § 1201.0245(b); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15140.5 (Deering Supp. 2017); CAL 
GOVT. §§ 53506(a), 53508.5 (Deering 2011 & Supp. 2017). 
274. Compare CAL. EDUC. § 15144.1 (Deering Supp. 2017) (explaining a method of analysis 
that looks at each series of general obligation bonds in isolation), with TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245(g) 
(West Supp. 2017) (describing a method of CAB analysis that takes account all of the issuer’s general 
obligation bonds). 
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A. Prohibiting or Restricting the Use of CABs 
Misuse of CABs could be eliminated by prohibiting or restricting their 
use.  The focus of these solutions is preventing districts from taking 
advantage of incentives to benefit today’s population at the expense of 
tomorrow’s, and addressing concerns about the lack of expertise of school 
district officials.  However, an outright prohibition—or even carefully 
drafted restrictions—on the use of CABs could prevent their use in 
circumstances where the benefits outweigh the costs (especially when the 
expected rate limit or another legal constraint would otherwise prevent the 
issuance of debt at all) and likely would have disparate impacts on districts 
with different characteristics.  These concerns might be addressed by 
allowing districts to issue CABs, or CABs outside specified parameters, 
with the approval of a state agency, or by providing alternative funding 
sources.   
Prohibiting the Use of CABs.  One means of eliminating the misuse 
of CABs is to ban them entirely.  School districts in Michigan were banned 
from issuing capital appreciation bonds in 1994.275  In 2013, legislation 
was unsuccessfully introduced in California that declared the legislature’s 
intent to prohibit school districts from issuing CABs.276  Similarly, 
legislation that would have prohibited the issuance of all CABs by Texas 
local governments was introduced in 2013, and legislation that would have 
prohibited the issuance of CABs payable from ad valorem property taxes by 
Texas local governments was introduced in 2014 and 2015, though none 
of these measures passed.277   
Restricting the Use of CABs.  The misuse of capital appreciation 
bonds could be reduced or eliminated by restrictions on the issuance of 
this type of debt.  Both California’s AB 182 and Texas’s HB 114 adopted 
this approach (as well as that of providing additional information), 
narrowing the parameters within which school districts (and, in the case of 
Texas, other local governments) can issue CABs payable from ad valorem 
property taxes.278  While one can debate whether the restrictions in 
 
275. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 380.1351b (West 2016). 
276. See S.B. 685, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (“It is the intent of the Legislature to 
enact legislation that prohibits a school district from issuing capital appreciation bonds.”). 
277. Tex. H.B. 1750, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015); Tex. S.B. 103, 84th Leg., R.S. (2014); Tex. 
H.B. 3416, 83rd Leg., R.S. (2013). 
278. Assemb. B. 182, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., 
R.S., ch. 991, §§ 1–3, sec. 1201.0245, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 3517, 3519 (codified at TEX. GOV’T 
CODE § 1201.0245). 
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AB 182 or HB 114 strike the appropriate balance, carefully tailored 
legislation could prevent the most problematic CABs issuances.  
Problems with Prohibiting or Restricting the Use of CABs.  A 
prohibition or restriction that applied only to CABs, but not to other back-
loaded debt structures, would only partially address concerns about 
interperiod equity, though it would eliminate one of the most egregious 
violations of the principle.  However, the restriction could be drafted to 
apply to all back-loaded debt structures.  For example, prior to 2010, many 
California local government general obligation bond issuances (including 
school district bonds with maturities in excess of twenty-five years) were 
required to have substantially level debt service with limited exceptions.279  
An outright prohibition or even the most carefully drafted restrictions 
on the use of CABs—or back-loaded debt structures, generally—might 
preclude districts from beneficial transactions such as financing needed 
facilities or obtaining savings by refinancing debts,280 or might push them 
towards using less desirable financing options.  These issues would be of 
particular concern for rapidly growing school districts, property-poor 
districts and districts where assessed valuations have declined—all of 
which may be particularly likely to issue CABs to avoid violating estimated 
tax rate limits.281   
Waivers.  Allowing a state entity to authorize CABs issuances that 
would otherwise be prohibited would provide additional flexibility and 
input from experts.282  A statewide agency approving bonds or waiving 
 
279. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53508.5 (Deering 1993), repealed by Assemb. B. 1388, 2009–2010 
Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009). 
280. Supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
281. See supra Section IV (discussing rapidly growing school districts, property-poor districts, 
and districts where assessed valuations have declined). 
282. Another alternative would be to give a county official or agency, such as the County 
Treasurer or County Department of Education, authority to grant a waiver.  See Statement by Dan 
McAllister, San Diego County Treasurer-Tax Collector, Capital Appreciation Bonds 5 Point Plan 
Goals (2016) (on file with author) (suggesting, prior to the passage of AB 182, that school district 
CABs be approved by either the County Superintendent of Schools or the County Board of 
Supervisors, and that issuances outside of certain parameters be approved by the County 
Superintendent of Schools); see also CAL. ASS’N OF CTY. TREASURERS & TAX COLLECTORS, SCHOOL 
FINANCE COMMITTEE, SCHOOL FINANCE HANDBOOK FOR TTCS 18–19 (2015) (suggesting greater 
county involvement in school district general obligations that fall outside of specified parameters); 
L.A. CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 86, at 127 (recommending greater involvement by 
County Office of Education, Auditor, Treasurer-Tax Collector and others in school district 
financings).  While county officials and agencies would be more familiar with the needs of the region, 
allowing waivers at the county level is likely to lead to inconsistent policies within the state and, 
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restrictions on bond issuances is not a novel concept.  In California, the 
State Board of Education currently waives the limit on general obligation 
debt as a percentage of assessed valuation for school districts and is 
authorized to waive some of the new restrictions on CABs in limited 
circumstances.283  In North Carolina, local governments cannot issue any 
general obligation bonds without the approval of the North Carolina Local 
Government Commission.284   
CDIAC and the TBRB might be the appropriate entities to grant 
waivers of restrictions on CABs in California and Texas, respectively.285  
CDIAC’s role is to provide “information, education and technical 
assistance on debt issuance and public fund investments to local public 
agencies and other public finance professionals,”286 while TBRB’s mission 
is, in part, “to support and enhance the debt issuance and debt 
management functions of state and local entities.”287  CDIAC and TBRB 
would have the general financial expertise and, particularly if they were 
responsible for granting waivers of the limitations on CABs, the expertise 
with CABs specifically, to determine whether a waiver was appropriate in a 
particular case.  In California, the State Board of Education would be 
another possibility—this board already provides some waivers.288   
 
particularly in smaller counties, the person or people responsible for granting the waiver may not 
have significantly more expertise than the individuals at the school district. 
283. See DAYTON, supra note 42, at 45 (noting that between 2000 and 2014, fifty-one waivers 
of the limit on general obligation debt as a percentage of assessed valuation were requested, of which 
forty-eight were approved).  The State Board of Education may waive provisions of AB 182 for 
bonds that refinance bond anticipation notes issued before December 31, 2013, if certain conditions 
are met.  CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15144.3 (Deering 2016). 
284. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 159-51 (West 2016).  North Carolina law also provides that for 
issuances that include CABs, the North Carolina Local Government Commission may require that 
annual debt service on the bonds be as nearly level as possible, may limit the amount of CABs and 
may require that the use of CABs will not increase the aggregate amount of debt service on the 
bonds.  Id. § 159-100(b). 
285. Others have suggested that CDIAC could fulfill a similar function, at least with respect 
to transactions that are more likely to be problematic, perhaps in conjunction with lowering voter 
approval requirements.  See David Gamage & Darien Shanske, The Case for a State-Level Debt-Financing 
Authority, 67 ST. TAX NOTES 188, 193 (2013) (identifying CDIAC as an appropriate entity to approve 
debt issuances in conjunction with a reduction in voter approval thresholds for local government 
debt). 
286. CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, About CDIAC, CAL. ST. TREASURER, 
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/introduction.asp [https://perma.cc/H6GU-GYLB]. 
287. Tex. Bond Review Bd., Agency Overview, http://www.brb.state.tx.us/ 
agency/about_brb.aspx [https://perma.cc/HEY3-GUKP]. 
288. See DAYTON, supra note 42, at 44–45 (analyzing waiver requests and approvals between 
2000 and 2014). 
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Alternative Funding.  Banning or restricting the use of CABs would 
have the effect of restricting the funding available to school districts that 
could not issue CIBs without violating the applicable expected rate limit.  
If the facilities these districts would otherwise finance are needed, an 
alternative funding source would have to be found.  
In new developments, developer fees are one option.  California school 
districts are authorized to levy fees on developers for the construction or 
reconstruction of school facilities,289 though Texas school districts do not 
have this authority under current law.290  Bonds payable from other 
property-based taxes that are not subject to the expected rate limit, such as 
Mello-Roos taxes in California, are another alternative, particularly for new 
developments (where a developer can approve the tax before there are 
multiple property owners).291  However, both of these forms of financing 
are more advantageous to developing areas than to existing communities, 
and increasing their use may further encourage urban sprawl292 and 
exacerbate already existing funding disparities. 
Alternatively, the state could provide additional loans and grants, ideally 
in a way that targets districts with the greatest needs and that are most 
adversely impacted by the prohibition or restriction on the use of CABs.  
It is likely there would be political resistance to perceived redistribution of 
wealth from some regions of the state to others,293 and there is a risk that 
 
289. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 17620(a)(1) (Deering 2016). 
290. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 395.001, 395.012 (West 2015 & Supp. 2017) 
(providing impact fees may be collected only for specified purposes, which do not include schools). 
291. The “vast majority of the [Mello-Roos districts] in Orange County are created and debt 
incurred before any of the ultimate taxpayers acquire their property.”  ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, 
MELLO-ROOS: PERPETUAL DEBT ACCUMULATION AND TAX ASSESSMENT OBLIGATION 3 (2015), 
http://www.ocgrandjury. org/pdfs/2014_2015_GJreport/Mello-Roos_Website.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/RA9V-UQ6M].  The same is likely true elsewhere.  See supra note 108 (discussing Mello-Roos 
taxes in further detail). 
292. See Darien Shanske, Above All Else Stop Digging: Local Government Law as a (Partial) Cause of 
(and Solution to) the Current Housing Crisis, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 663, 669 (2010) (suggesting Mello-
Roos taxes encourage urban sprawl). 
293. Some suggest “[p]eople are much more willing to tax themselves to pay for public 
education in their own local communities[]” than in other communities.  Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo & 
John Joseph Wallis, Lessons for California from the History of Fiscal Constitutions, 2 CAL. J. OF POL. & 
POL’Y, no. 3, 2010, at 1, 15, available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/72b124q1 
[https://perma.cc/L857-B46P]; see FISCHEL, supra note 104, at 98–118 (asserting the court-mandated 
shift of school funding from local communities to the state led to the 1978 voter approval of 
Proposition 13, which severely limits property taxes in California).  This proposition was debated in 
the UCLA Law Review.  See Kirk Stark & Jonathan Zasloff, Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really 
Cause Proposition 13?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 801, 801 (2003); see also William A. Fischel, Did John Serrano 
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political factors would result in a less than optimal distribution of these 
resources.  Nevertheless, grants or loans may be a better solution than the 
alternatives of denying these districts needed facilities, allowing them to 
issue CABs through a waiver program, or pushing them towards using 
more expensive and less desirable lease revenue bonds or certificates of 
participation.294  A targeted state grant or loan program could instead 
assist in addressing some of the inherent inequity of a system that relies 
largely on property tax revenues to finance capital projects for school 
districts: that tax rates in property-poor districts must be higher than in 
property-rich districts to pay for comparable facilities. 
B. Reducing Incentives to Use CABs 
Reducing incentives to use CABs could eliminate many instances of 
misuse, and might have other benefits as well.  While some circumstances 
that encourage the use of CABs—such as rapidly growing student 
populations or the desire to maintain substantially level tax rates—cannot 
be changed, others can.  Some of these are discussed below. 
Re-evaluating Tax Rate Limitations.  Debt limits and other 
restrictions may simply encourage the development of alternative means of 
accomplishing the same objectives; means that are “usually more complex, 
more expensive, and typically are not discussed in public forums in ways 
that are intelligible to the public and elected officials.”295  CABs are an 
 
Vote for Proposition 13? A Reply to Stark and Zasloff’s “Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause 
Propsition 13?” 51 UCLA L. REV. 887, 887–88 (2004).  While Stark and Zasloff disagree with Fischell’s 
position, they do note that shifts from local to state funding of public schools may reduce the level of 
such funding.  Stark & Zasloff, supra, at 854.  Based on data from the Institute for Social Research 
Center for California Studies at California State University, Sacramaento, more than 70% of school 
district general obligation bond ballot measures in 2014 included language to the effect that funds 
would be spent locally or could not be taken by the state.  INST. FOR SOC. RESEARCH, 2012 
ELECTIONS, supra note 49, at 19–39. 
294. See Gamkhar & Koerner, supra note 175, at 38 (noting property-poor districts are more 
likely to use lease revenue bonds, which may increase disparities because of the higher interest rates 
on these bonds); see also supra notes 189–95 (discussing reasons these are less desirable).  In addition, 
because the school district obligations in these transactions are characterized as lease payments, the 
nature of these transactions may be obscured from the public. 
295. See JEFFREY I. CHAPMAN, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., PROPOSITION 13: SOME 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 15 (1998), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/op_998jcop.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NZX2-RX5H] (discussing the effects of Proposition 13, which reduced property 
taxes and eliminated general obligation bonds until subsequent constitutional amendments added the 
California Two-Thirds Regime and later the California 55% Regime); see also Briffault, supra note 95, 
at  925–27 (suggesting debt limits have not significantly affected the amount of debt but have made it 
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example of this to the extent they are used to avoid violating the expected 
rate limits.  Thus, it is critical that the expected rate limits be evaluated to 
determine whether they are appropriate or should be modified.   
Current expected rate limits may be unduly restrictive and create more 
problems than they solve.  Assessed valuations may have increased at a 
slower rate than inflation,296 and as a result, taxes at the specified limit 
may be less burdensome than was contemplated when the restrictions 
were put in place.  A legislature might conclude that the relevant expected 
rate limit should be higher or even eliminated in some or all circumstances.  
For example, in 2015, the Texas Legislature considered a proposal to raise 
the estimated tax rate for rapidly growing school districts as long as they 
met certain conditions.297  A 2011 Texas bill would have replaced the 
current test with a cap on the amount of outstanding debt as a percentage 
of assessed valuation.298  While these bills ultimately failed, it is possible a 
legislature would find a different modification appropriate (or find the 
same modification appropriate at a different time).  The elimination or 
relaxing of expected rate limits almost certainly would reduce the use of 
CABs.   
On the other hand, a legislature might determine that the applicable 
expected rate limitation is appropriate, or even that the limit should be 
more restrictive.  Expected rate limits certainly provide protection to 
current taxpayers and at least some protection to future taxpayers.299  If a 
limit is retained, additional protection should be provided to future 
 
more expensive and less transparent).  But see Farnham, supra note 34, at 1198 (finding limits reduce 
debt levels but voter approval requirements do not). 
296. This is particularly true in California, where Proposition 13 (passed in 1978) limits 
assessed valuation increases.  CDIAC PRIMER, supra note 30, at 85–86.  Inflation has averaged 4.1% 
per year since 1978 while assessed valuation increases are capped at the lesser of inflation or 2% 
absent a change in ownership or new construction.  CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA’S 
PROPERTY TAX 1 (2012), http://www.lao.ca.gov/handouts/state_admin/2012/CA_Property_Tax_ 
4_11_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3QD-MNWP]. 
297. Tex. H.B. 506, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015). 
298. Tex. H.B. 2168, 82nd Leg., R.S. (2011). 
299. A binding limit on tax rates would provide greater protection, but because it also would 
increase the risk to bondholders, interest rates on the bonds would be higher and the ability to issue 
debt might be constrained.  The expected rate limit for California school districts was originally 
drafted as a tax rate cap, but was transformed into an expected rate limit before it took effect because 
of these concerns.  See Assemb. B. 1908, 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (authorizing a cap on 
the tax rate to be levied to pay debt service on bonds authorized under the California 55% Regime); 
SCOTT, supra note 49, at 12–14 (explaining the initial requirement of California AB 1908 as an 
“absolute, ironclad limit on tax rates to be levied to repay bonds under Prop. 39” and the change to a 
limit on the projected tax rate, and describing its replacement with an expected rate limit). 
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taxpayers.  For example, the legislature could impose reasonable 
parameters on assessed valuation growth assumptions for purposes of 
calculating compliance as the Texas legislature has endeavored to do, or 
could require that projections take into account those made by the county 
assessor, as a new California law requires for school boards ordering bond 
elections.300  Reducing the ability of school districts to issue bonds based 
on overly optimistic assumptions about assessed valuation growth would 
be likely to reduce the use of CABs and other back-loaded debt structures.  
A prohibition on CABs or a requirement that property taxes be levied as 
interest compounds also would protect future taxpayers, though these 
options come with significant problems.301   
Par to Par Refunding Requirement.  The Texas constitutional 
provision that limits the amount of school district general obligation 
refunding bonds that can be issued without voter approval to the principal 
amount of the bonds being refinanced,302 and similar provisions, should 
be reevaluated.  It may be that replacing this restriction with one that 
requires that the refunding bonds result in overall debt service savings or 
even annual debt service savings would better protect taxpayers and would 
eliminate one of the motivators for CABs in states that have provisions of 
this type.303   
Modifying the Promises Made to Voters.  School districts use CABs 
to simultaneously meet commitments to voters about tax rates and capital 
projects.304  While a state would not be likely to (nor should it) prohibit 
school districts from disclosing planned capital projects or estimated tax 
rates to voters, it could require that other information be provided to 
change the perception of what is being promised.  This could discourage, 
or at least reduce the motivation for, using CABs.  For example, requiring 
the total expected cost of repayment of the debt to be included with ballot 
 
300. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 45.0031(b), (c) (West 2012); see CAL. EDUC. CODE 
§ 15100(c) (Deering 2016) (requiring school boards ordering bond elections to obtain assessed 
valuation projections that take into account those made by the county assessor).  Although there is 
no similar mandate for determinations of compliance with expected rate limits, having the 
requirement in another context increases the likelihood that the same practice will be followed here. 
301. See supra Section VI.A., “Problems with Prohibiting or Restricting the Use of CABs” and 
infra “Collecting Property Taxes Throughout the Life of the CABs.” 
302. See supra Section IV.F. 
303. Admittedly, where, as in Texas, the provision is in the state constitution, it will be more 
difficult to modify the provision since doing so would require a constitutional amendment.   
304. See supra Section IV.B., “Keeping Promises to Voters.” 
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materials, as became required in California beginning in 2015,305 might 
deter districts from using more expensive debt structures.  Similarly, 
requiring disclosure of the assumptions used in estimated tax rate 
calculations, a clear statement that actual rates may be higher in ballot 
materials—and perhaps anywhere else that districts publish the estimated 
rates—and statements that projects might not be completed in some 
circumstances (for example, if issuing the bonds necessary to complete 
them were projected to raise tax rates over specified levels), or some 
combination of or all of the above, could reduce the sense that estimated 
rates and listed projects are “promises.”306  Even if this did not reduce the 
use of CABs, it would make important information more readily available 
to the public.   
Establishing reasonable parameters for assessed valuation growth 
assumptions for purposes of calculating projected tax rates included with 
ballot materials also might reduce the use of CABs because there would be 
less likelihood that school district boards and officials would face 
difficulties keeping the “promise[s]” made to voters about tax rates and 
capital projects.307  A California law that requires school boards ordering 
an election to obtain “reasonable and informed projections of assessed 
property valuations that take into consideration projections of assessed 
property valuations made by the county assessor”308 beginning in 2017 is 
a step in the right direction.  Although the new law does not specify a 
projection methodology or require that the assessor’s projections be used, 
there likely is a benefit to the board having this information from the party 
that is responsible for determining the taxable value of property in the 
county.  Further, while the requirement does not speak directly to the 
projections that are provided to voters, it is likely that school boards would 
provide tax rate estimates based on these projections or if they did not, 
that they would have a reasoned basis for basing estimates on different 
projections.   
In addition, counting interest on CABs against voter authorization and, 
in California, limits on debt as a percentage of assessed valuation, would 
 
305. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9401(a)(4) (Deering 2016). 
306. See ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83, at 31, 33 (suggesting 
districts make assessed valuation assumptions supporting historical data and an explanation of the 
basis for the assumptions available to voters). 
307. See supra Section IV.E. for discussion of these assumptions. 
308. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15100(c) (Deering 2013 & Supp. 2017). 
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more clearly comply with the binding promises made to the voters not to 
issue debt exceeding these limits.  This is discussed in Section VI.C.   
Re-evaluating Matching Fund Requirements and Providing 
Alternative Funding Sources.  State grants that cannot be accessed 
unless the district is contributing funds to the project encourage districts to 
issue CABs to maximize the amount the district can contribute to the 
project (and hence the amount of state funding it can receive).  These 
incentives should be considered when evaluating the costs and benefits of 
matching fund programs and contemplating alternative funding 
approaches.  Similarly, alternative funding sources for school districts, 
particularly for districts that may have stronger incentives to issue CABs, 
may alleviate some of the pressures to use this financing structure.   
Collecting Property Taxes throughout the Life of the CABs.  If 
state law required school districts to collect property taxes to pay interest 
as it compounded, they likely would issue far fewer capital appreciation 
bonds since one of the principal reasons they use CABs is to avoid tax 
increases in the near term (because of expected rate limits or otherwise).  
Districts would still have the flexibility to issue CABs (at least if they 
weren’t constrained by expected rate limits) if doing so were the most 
cost-effective financing method in the circumstances.   
To the extent a district did issue CABs, taxpayers would be paying for 
debt service through the life of the bonds, addressing one of the major 
problems with this type of debt.  School districts and other issuers could 
either pay the principal and interest compounded on that principal over a 
period of several years, or invest amounts collected until the time payment 
is due on the bonds.309  While requiring funds to be put aside far in 
advance of scheduled payment dates is uncommon for tax-exempt bonds, 
some taxable municipal bond transactions include these provisions.310   
 
309. In the case of tax-exempt bonds, school investment of these amounts would be subject 
to provisions of Section 148 of the Internal Revenue Code and related regulations that restrict the 
yield on such investments to the yield on the bonds.  26 U.S.C. § 148 (2012).   
310. See, e.g., ALHAMBRA UNIFIED SCH. DIST., $13,199,720.85 ELECTION OF 2008 GENERAL 
OBLIGATION BONDS, SERIES B (TAX-EXEMPT), $11,800,800.00 ELECTION OF 2008 GENERAL 
OBLIGATION BONDS, SERIES B-1 (QUALIFIED SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION BONDS – DIRECT 
PAYMENT TO ISSUER) (FEDERALLY TAXABLE) 15 (2011), http://emma.msrb.org/EP494671-
EP385881-EP782826.pdf [https://perma.cc/D27A-VHLH] (indicating sinking fund deposits are 
required although the bonds are not subject to mandatory sinking fund redemption); S. SAN 
ANTONIO INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT DATED AUGUST 3, 2010, at 5–7 (2010), 
http://emma.msrb.org/EA402884-EA315370-EA711082.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7CG-BL8P] 
(stating requirement that sinking fund deposits be made with respect to bonds that are not subject to 
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Requiring taxes to be levied as interest compounds would be consistent 
with accrual accounting principles, under which interest would be treated 
as an expense as it compounds.311  Such a requirement also would be 
consistent with the treatment of interest that is not paid until maturity 
(such as interest on CABs) and original issue discount for federal income 
tax purposes.  Under the Internal Revenue Code and related regulations, 
these amounts generally are included in income and deducted as expenses 
as they accrue over the term of the debt.312   
However, requiring the collection of taxes to pay interest as it 
compounds would prevent districts that were constrained by expected rate 
limits from issuing general obligation bonds at all.  Like prohibiting or 
restricting the use of CABs, this approach could prevent districts from 
completing needed projects, and might disproportionately affect rapidly 
growing and property-poor districts.  As a result, a waiver program or 
alternative funding sources might be needed. 
C. Providing Additional Information, Training, Guidance, or a Combination of 
These 
A third approach, driven by concerns that school districts issue CABs 
without understanding the ramifications of doing so, is to require that 
additional information be presented to district officials and the public, to 
provide training and support to governing boards and officials, and to 
strengthen the ability of districts to negotiate with financial advisors and 
underwriters.  In a similar vein, counting compounded interest against 
voter-authorized amounts and, in California, the limit on debt as a 
percentage of assessed valuations, would make the true amount of debt 
being incurred clearer both to school district board members and officials, 
and to the public. 
 
mandatory sinking fund redemption).  Mandatory deposits likely would preserve the economic 
benefit of CABs when interest rates are high better than mandatory prepayments because investors 
presumably require that CABs subject to mandatory prepayment have a higher yield to account for 
the possibility that they would have to reinvest not only earnings but also principal at lower yields 
prior to the scheduled maturity date. 
311. See supra notes 123–29 and accompanying text. 
312. See GARLOCK, supra note 123, at ch. 2, 5 (describing the applicable rules and exceptions); 
see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 1212, GUIDE TO 
ORIGINAL ISSUE DISCOUNT (OID) INSTRUMENTS (2016), https://www.irs.gov/publications/p1212 
[https://perma.cc/66QK-R3UY] (explaining how OID is included in income and providing some 
exceptions).  These rules treat CABs and zero-coupon bonds identically.  GARLOCK, supra, note 123, 
at 28, para. 201. 
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Requirements to Provide Information.  Both AB 182 and HB 114 
require that school boards and the public receive additional information 
about CABs issuances, including information on overall debt service and 
the assumptions that are being made about growth in assessed 
valuations.313  Some districts have refinanced their CABs in recent years, 
even when doing so increased taxes in the short run, presumably in 
response to greater awareness and negative public attention given to 
CABs.314  On the other hand, issuances of general obligation CABs by 
California school districts increased significantly in 2015 despite the 
additional information requirements included in AB 182.315  However, 
even if additional information does not ultimately reduce issuances of 
CABs, it will increase board members’ and district officials’ understanding 
of the implications of the actions they are taking and public awareness, 
thereby possibly preventing some of the most problematic issuances.   
 
313. See Assemb. B. 182, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (mandating the presentation of 
additional information to school boards and the public on bonds sales that allow for the 
compounding of interest); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 1201.0245(b), (d) (West Supp. 2017) 
(requiring additional information be provided to the school board, included in the board’s minutes 
and posted on the district’s website).  The California Association of County Treasurers and Tax 
Collectors similarly recommends that boards considering a bond measure receive information about 
the assumed assessed valuation growth rates reflected in tax rate projections and information about 
historic assessed valuation growth.  See CAL. ASS’N OF CTY TREASURERS AND TAX COLLECTORS, 
supra note 283, at 9, 18 (recommending the board be presented with information about assumptions, 
expected use of CABs and other information). 
314. At least nine school districts and community college districts have refinanced CABs in 
recent years.  See Napa School Bonds Converted to Save Taxpayers Money, VALLEJO TIMES-HERALD, 
(Jan. 25, 2016, 4:03 PM), http://www.timesheraldonline.com/general-news/20160125/napa-school-
bonds-converted-to-save-taxpayers-money [https://perma.cc/2F35-2Y6G]; see also District Completes 
Successful Bond Sale, DUBLIN UNIFIED SCH., https://www.dublin.k12.ca.us/site/ 
default.aspx?PageType=3&DomainID=1&ModuleInstanceID=1197&ViewID=047E6BE3-6D87-
4130-8424-D8E4E9ED6C2A&RenderLoc=0&FlexDataID=31507&PageID=1 [https://perma.cc/ 
K6AK-5Y53].  Some of these transactions resulted in higher tax rates in the near term.  Keeley 
Webster, California School CABs Make Comeback, THE BOND BUYER (Jan. 28, 2016, 12:55 PM), 
http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionalnews/california-school-cabs-make-comeback-1095112-
1.html [https://perma.cc/GW2T-K278].  However, the Poway Unified School District did not 
refinance its CABs after extensive discussion and three public meetings, perhaps because of the 
public opposition to possibly raising tax rates without obtaining voter approval.  See POWAY 
UNIFIED SCH. DIST., BOARD BRIEFS: HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE OCT. 13, 2014 BOARD OF 
EDUCATION MEETING 1–2 (2014), https://www.powayusd.com/board/boardBriefs/2014-
15BoardBriefs/10-13-14PUSDBoardBriefs.pdf [https://perma.cc/VH34-NADV] (showing 53.75% 
of the voters opposed the CABs because of tax concerns). 
315. See CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, Capital Appreciation Bond Issuance – After the 
Passage of AB 182, DEBT LINE, June 2016, at 3 (showing an increase in CAB issuance of $665 million 
from 2014 to 2015). 
65
White: CABs, Why They Are Used, and What Can Be Done to Prevent Misuse
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018
  
428 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:363 
Another step in the direction of transparency would be to require 
school districts and other issuers to post debt service schedules for all their 
general obligation bonds as well as estimates of future tax rates and the 
assumptions underlying those estimates on their websites, or, better yet, to 
provide this information to the state for posting on sites like the Texas 
Comptroller’s “Texas Transparency” site316 and the California Treasurer’s 
“Debt Watch” site.317  While, at least in many cases, overall debt service 
schedules can be located on the MSRB’s electronic municipal market 
access web site,318 members of the public likely would not know to go to 
a site designed for municipal bond investors and might have difficulty 
locating the information.  Information about estimated future tax rates and 
the assumptions underlying those estimates would be even more difficult 
to locate.  Having this information readily available would improve 
transparency and would be a step towards capitalization of debt service 
structures into home values.   
Training and Other Support.  Additional education of school boards 
and district staff members would increase their understanding of the 
implications of capital appreciation bonds, and of debt financings 
generally.319   
In addition to training, information about what other districts are doing 
and the fees and interest rates that other districts pay could assist districts 
in their decision-making.  It is particularly difficult for issuers and their 
advisors to compare fees and valuations for more complicated types of 
bonds320 (since CABs are far less common than CIBs they likely would 
fall in this category).  While some information about costs of issuance and 
 
316. Transparency, TEXAS COMPTROLLER, https://comptroller.texas.gov/transparency/ 
[https://perma.cc/F5FX-KARY]. 
317. Debt Watch, CALIFORNIA STATE TREASURER, http://debtwatch.treasurer.ca.gov/ 
[https://perma.cc/7XW2-SJTS]. 
318. ELECTRONIC MUN. MKT. ACCESS (EMMA), supra note 223. 
319. Others have recommended providing more education and training about bonds and debt 
management.  See U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N, STATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL DEBT 
MANAGEMENT, supra note 212, at 43–45 (“Just as many State tax agencies are now providing in-
service training for local assessors, so should the States be instructing local finance officers in the 
intricacies of borrowing money.”); see also Bill Simonsen, et al., supra note 214, at 715 (recommending 
counties or states provide “advisory services and technical assistance,” including training, to smaller 
governments, though noting that training alone may not be sufficient). 
320. Ang & Green, supra note 77, at 10. 
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interest rates is available from CDIAC and the TBRB,321 the information 
is not complete.  For example, the yield is provided for the entire bond 
issue, not for each series or maturity, and there is a lag between the time 
fees and interest rates are established and the time the information is 
available through these entities; other local governments are unlikely to 
know the specific reasons for variations in costs.  While this information is 
valuable, it does not provide issuers with all the information they need to 
evaluate the rates they are receiving.   
Other types of assistance also would be beneficial.  For example, the 
Los Angeles County Treasurer and Tax Collector’s Office developed a set 
of form documents that several school districts used to competitively bid 
for bond counsel, financial advisors and underwriters.322  Such forms 
have reportedly saved the districts “tens of thousands of dollars.”323  The 
availability of one-on-one guidance from an entity like CDIAC or the 
TBRB, or even the option of having one of these entities or another state 
agency manage the bond issuance process for school districts on a purely 
voluntary basis would be valuable.324  In addition to potentially preventing 
school districts from entering into transactions that would be 
disadvantageous and helping eliminate information asymmetries regarding 
fees and interest rates, access to disinterested technical expertise could 
enable districts to evaluate the risks of more complex or unusual 
transactions and enter into these transactions when it was beneficial to do 
so.325   
Additional Regulation of Financial Advisors and Underwriters.  
Financial advisors and underwriters are already regulated at the federal 
 
321. CAL. DEBT AND INVEST. ADVISORY COMMISSION, http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/ 
cdiac/index.asp [https://perma.cc/J7GR-MYAB]; TEX. BOND REV. BD., http://www.brb. 
state.tx.us/ [https://perma.cc/56CD-LQAK]. 
322. Memorandum from Mark J. Saladino, Cty. of L.A. Treasurer and Tax Collector to Mark 
Ridley-Thomas, et al., 2 (Aug. 8, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum from Mark J. 
Saladino]. 
323. Id. 
324. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations made similar suggestions in 
1965.  U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N, STATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL DEBT MANAGEMENT, 
supra note 212, at 46–47, 55–58.  More recently, commentators suggested creating a nonprofit that, 
among other things, would provide affordable, independent advice to municipalities.  Ang & Green, 
supra note 77, at 6, 13–15, 17. 
325. See Whitaker, supra note 213 (noting lack of expertise may lead smaller local governments 
to avoid complex transactions even when they would be beneficial). 
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level,326 but additional state regulation also may be appropriate.  This 
would not be unprecedented.  California already has laws that regulate 
some aspects of the relationship between local governments and their 
financial advisors327 and other laws have been proposed but not 
adopted.328   
State and local government agencies might also take independent 
actions to curtail underwriter and financial advisor behavior that they 
deem inappropriate.  For example, in 2012 the California Treasurer 
threatened to exclude underwriters involved in “egregious” California 
school district CABs issuances from state bond issuances if they did not 
restructure the transactions, though he ultimately did allow them to 
participate in the state’s bond issuances.329  In 2016, the California 
treasurer announced that underwriters, financial advisors, and bond 
counsel that make cash or in-kind contributions to, or provide certain 
types of services in support of, bond election campaigns in the state would 
not be eligible to provide services on state bond issuances.330  Similarly, 
 
326. For example, the activities of underwriters and municipal advisors are regulated under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (which is codified at Title 15 of the United States Code at 
Section 74(o-4)) and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board establishes rules that underwriters 
and municipal advisors must follow.  See MSRB Rules and Guidance, MUNICIPAL SEC. RULEMAKING 
BOARD., http://www.msrb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/MSRB-Rules.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
WFD6-QQ5B] (providing text of the MSRB rules governing underwriters and municipal advisors). 
327. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 53591, 53592 (Deering 2011) (requiring written contracts 
and prohibiting financial advisors from being compensated on the basis of a percentage of the 
amount of bonds sold and from purchasing bonds for which they served as financial advisor directly 
from the issuer). 
328. For example, bills have been introduced that would have prohibited local governments 
from hiring underwriters, financial advisors, or lawyers to provide services for issuances of general 
obligation bonds if those outside consultants had provided campaign services in support of or 
contributed to the ballot measure under which the bonds were approved.  Assemb. B. 621, 2013–
2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); Assemb. B. 1045, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal 2012); S.B. 623, 
2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); S.B. 1461, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); Assemb. B. 
2011, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).  One of these bills also would have prohibited local 
governments from hiring the same firm as financial advisor and as underwriter for a bond issue.  
Assemb. B. 621, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).   
329. See Randall Jensen, California CAB Underwriters May Pay in Spring, THE BOND BUYER 
(Nov. 6, 2012, 2:26 PM), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/121_215/california-cab-underwriters-
may-pay-in-spring-1045638-1.html [https://perma.cc/5DKX-WHS4]; see also Randall Jensen, Lockyer 
Caves on CAB Penalty, THE BOND BUYER (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/ 
122_29/california-treasurer-bill-lockyer-set-multi-billion-calendar-for-spring-1048596-1.html 
[https://perma.cc/HV9J-2QTZ].   
330. See Press Release, Cal. State Treasurer, Chiang and County Treasurers Move to Stop ‘Pay-
to-Play’ School Bond Campaigns (July 27, 2016), http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/news/ 
releases/2016/20160727.asp [https://perma.cc/3863-ADVN] (“[M]unicipal finance firms seeking 
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Los Angeles County prohibits underwriters that make cash contributions 
or provide in-kind services to promote school district or community 
college district general obligation bond ballot measures in California from 
selling county debt.331   
Counting Compounded Interest Against Debt Limits.  As was 
discussed in Section III.C., interest that compounds on capital 
appreciation bonds is not counted against voter-authorized amounts and 
limits on total debt outstanding.  Counting compounded interest for these 
purposes would be consistent with its accounting and tax treatment and 
would make the true amount of debt clearer to both school district 
officials and to the public.   
Rather than requiring school districts to determine compliance with 
debt limits as the interest compounds, state law could instead mandate that 
the anticipated compounded interest (to the extent not already included in 
the portion of original issue premium counted against voter authorization) 
be included in compliance calculations at the time the bonds are issued.  
This would eliminate the risk that a limit would not be met at the time the 
interest compounds.  For example, if assessed valuations declined after 
bonds were issued, the interest might violate a limit on debt as a 
percentage of assessed valuations like the one applicable to California 
school districts even if it would not have (had it been included at the time 
the bonds were issued)—a risk that bond purchasers presumably would be 
unwilling to bear without charging higher interest rates as compensation.  
In addition, this approach would impose a smaller administrative burden 
on districts than a requirement that they recalculate compliance each time 
interest compounds.  If a series of CABs were to be repaid prior to 
maturity, any interest that did not ultimately compound could be available 
again for a concurrent or future bond issuance.   
 
state business will be required to certify that they make no contributions to bond election 
campaigns.”); see also Form Letter from John Chiang, Cal. State Treasurer (July 27, 2016), 
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/news/releases/2016/20160727_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QY7-
BQAE] (defining “bond campaign services” as services such as “fundraising, public opinion polling, 
election strategy and management, organization of campaign volunteers, get out the vote services, 
development of campaign literature, and advocacy materials”). 
331. See CTY. OF L.A. TREASURER AND TAX COLLECTOR, REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF 
QUALIFICATIONS LOS ANGELES COUNTY UNDERWRITER POOL app. A at 2 (2015), 
[https://perma.cc/4XQK-YLKV] (“Firms in the Underwriter Pool are prohibited from making cash 
contributions or providing in-kind services to promote or facilitate California school or community 
college district campaigns for general obligation bond ballot measures.”); see also Memorandum from 
Mark J. Saladino, supra note 322 (describing the reasons for the prohibition).   
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Counting the full amount of interest at the time the debt is issued would 
arguably result in over-counting against the voter-authorized amount since 
the present value of interest that will compound in the future is less than 
the total dollar amount of that interest.  Furthermore, counting all interest 
that is expected to compound against limits on outstanding debt as a 
percentage of assessed valuations—such as the limit that applies to 
California school districts—at the time of issuance would, in effect, make 
these limits more restrictive to the extent that a district had outstanding 
debt that was scheduled to be repaid before the interest would compound.  
Nevertheless, the cost of this approach is small when compared with the 
problems created by testing the total debt against the limit as interest 
compounds.   
While the result of such legal changes might simply be that voters are 
asked to (and do) approve higher amounts of debt and that California 
school districts apply for waivers of the outstanding debt limit more 
frequently, these changes would still have a positive impact in that the full 
amount of debt would be clearer to elected officials, administrators and 
voters.   
VII.    CONCLUSION 
As the use of CABs by California and Texas school districts 
demonstrates, local governments have incentives to defer debt service to 
benefit today’s population at the expense of future residents, and these 
incentives are intensified in some circumstances.   
In theory, the problems associated with CABs and with back-loaded 
debt service structures, generally, could be solved by requiring substantially 
level debt service (allowing adjustment for expected inflation) on all bond 
issuances, and by treating compounding interest as debt service and 
requiring taxes to be levied in an amount sufficient to pay the interest as it 
compounds.  This would prevent the disproportionate burdening of future 
taxpayers while still allowing CABs to be used when they resulted in lower 
debt service costs.   
In practice, however, this solution would make it more difficult for 
issuers to maintain level tax rates, and in many instances, would result in 
higher near-term tax rates—particularly in districts that already have 
outstanding debt and in rapidly growing areas.  Districts that already have 
outstanding debt would not be able to structure new debt around their 
existing debt.  In rapidly growing areas, facilities are being constructed to 
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support a growing population and are expected to be paid by a larger 
future assessed valuation base.  Higher near-term tax rates would make it 
politically more difficult to issue debt and might result in underinvestment 
in infrastructure.  Furthermore, requiring substantially level debt service 
would prevent some issuers that are subject to expected rate limits from 
incurring any debt or making any significant investment in infrastructure.   
Thus, states are confronted with the challenge of restricting the ability 
of local governments to issue CABs (or back-loaded debt generally), or 
reducing their incentives to do so without driving them to use less 
desirable financing options, preventing the construction of needed 
facilities, or impeding refinancings that result in lower debt service.  The 
appropriate solution will vary from state to state and may differ for 
different types of local governments depending on factors such as: other 
state laws, the importance that a state places on local control, the severity 
of infrastructure needs, and the availability of alternate funding sources.  
Nevertheless, some general principles apply.   
First, addressing the incentives that lead local governments to issue 
CABs is likely to be more effective than restricting or prohibiting CABs or 
back-loaded debt.  Even the most carefully tailored restrictions will 
prevent some transactions that are socially desirable and allow some 
transactions that are not.  Further, issuers and their advisors will search for 
ways to meet their objectives without violating the restrictions.  The means 
they employ—such as lease revenue bonds, COPs, and potentially 
others—are likely to be more expensive or less transparent than general 
obligation CABs would have been, and may also create other problems.   
Thus, as an initial step, states should evaluate their existing laws to 
determine whether these laws are fulfilling their intended purposes and to 
what extent they are increasing incentives to issue CABs.  For example, 
states that impose expected rate limits on some or all local governments 
(as California and Texas do on school districts), should evaluate these 
limits since they are one of the principal reasons that CABs are used.  If 
these limits are to be retained, states should consider setting reasonable 
parameters for calculating projected assessed valuations.  States with par-
to-par refunding restrictions should consider the merits of those limits and 
whether they can be modified. 
States also should consider whether aspects of their systems for 
financing infrastructure are increasing incentives to issue CABs and, if so, 
whether these systems should be modified.  States that only provide 
funding for capital projects if local governments provide matching funds 
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may choose to reconsider these requirements.  States may also consider 
implementing or expanding grant or loan programs that target areas of 
particular need such as rapidly growing districts or property-poor districts 
with aging infrastructure.  Of course, infrastructure funding is complex 
and there are numerous considerations involved in the structuring of 
financing programs.  Incentives to issue CABs are but one factor that 
should be evaluated.   
Second, adequate training about debt and capital financing for local 
government board members and officials and access to expertise is very 
important.  Training and access to experts would allow local governments 
to make better decisions for their communities not only with respect to 
CABs and other back-loaded debt, but with respect to infrastructure 
financing generally.  The extent to which the involvement of state experts 
in financings is mandated or is at the option of the local government, likely 
will vary from state to state depending on the importance that a state and 
its residents place on local control. 
Finally, making information about the amount and structure of local 
government debt and about expected future tax rates and the assumptions 
underlying them to both local government board members and officials, 
and to the public is important.  Counting compounded interest against 
debt limits (at least absent a requirement that taxes be levied to pay that 
interest as it compounds) is a critical component of this.  Clear, accurate, 
and accessible information is important for local governments to make 
good decisions and for the public to be able to effectively participate in the 
democratic process.   
Given the important role that local government debt plays in the 
construction of public infrastructure in United States and the country’s 
looming infrastructure needs, these problems cannot be ignored.   
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